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Abstract 
The papers in this dissertation share a common theme of measuring policy effects in urban 
markets. Though focusing on different outcomes – access to rental housing, property values, and 
school enrollments – the desire to understand how policy influences the composition of an urban 
ecosystem provides the link. A particular emphasis is placed on housing, because housing is 
simultaneously and a basic requirement for humans to thrive and the primary source of most 
local finance in the U.S. When policy affects housing, be it directly or indirectly, it can have 
important and far-reaching consequences. Understanding the intended and unintended 
consequences of urban policy is thus central to this dissertation research and my future research 
agenda. 
Chapter 1 offers the first evidence of differential treatment occurring across the broad spectrum 
of racial and protected classes covered under the law. Employing a fully randomized 
correspondence audit design and a sample of more than 9,500 online housing advertisements, the 
study offers insight about which protected groups experience the most/least favorable treatment 
when searching for housing. This study employs a new signaling strategy in order to provide the 
first evidence of how landlord treatment of rental housing applicants varies across the spectrum 
of protected classes. The findings suggest rental-housing providers have preferences about 
tenants and make decisions based on signals communicated in inquiry emails from potential 
applicants. The findings also suggest differential treatment is generally consistent with theory of 
agent-based statistical discrimination.  
Chapter 2 presents an experiment designed to influence rental agent behavior to increase equal 
treatment in rental housing. The purpose is to test whether property owners and rental agents will 
change their behavior in response to being informed about their obligations under fair housing 
	  
	  
law. The project thus conducts a randomized experiment employs a correspondence housing 
audit methodology to measure the impact, representing the first time in which the audit 
methodology is employed to measure the effect of a randomized experiment. The results of the 
experiment consistently suggest the group of landlords who received information about fair 
housing law responded at a higher rate than did those who did not receive the treatment email. 
The primary contribution of this paper, then, is to demonstrate a unique opportunity to test policy 
interventions aimed at reducing discrimination in a real housing market and at a very low cost. 
My hope is that the method will be modified and expanded by fair housing agencies, advocates, 
and other institutions to test and implement policy interventions in hopes of reducing barriers to 
access in housing.  
Chapter 3 examines the impact of a place-based program on urban property values and school 
enrolments. A recent trend in place-based policy targets college attainment by offering tuition 
scholarships for qualified students in under-resourced public schools. In an era of rising college 
costs, these programs represent a potentially large financial benefit to those living within the 
attendance zones of qualifying schools. The benefit of such programs should be capitalized into 
local property values and school district enrolment, as programs are directly linked to attendance 
zones. This research thus examines the impact a large scholarship program, Say Yes to 
Education, has on school enrolments and property values in upstate New York. Examining 
district enrollment from 2000 through 2014, the analysis finds that after years of steady declines 
in enrollments, both Syracuse and Buffalo saw enrollment increases that coincide with the 
adoption of the Say Yes to Education program. These increases occurred at different points in 
time in each city. The housing values results provide some evidence that increases in housing 
prices accompanied the adoption of Say Yes in Syracuse, but not in Buffalo. These results are 
	  
	  
consistent with findings that enrolment growth in Buffalo may have been driven by students who 
would otherwise have attended private schools, while enrollment growth in Syracuse may have 
been driven by students who would otherwise have attended school in the surrounding suburbs. 
Combined with the enrolment effects, the analysis suggests that the ability of place-based 
scholarships to attract residents into a central city is likely to depend on both the specific 
provisions of the program and the context in which it is implemented.
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Executive  Summary  
	  
Rental  Housing  Discrimination  (Chapters  1  and  2)  
The objective of the first two papers is to measure housing discrimination (Chapter 1) and test a 
mitigation strategy (Chapter 2). The focus is rental housing, because the rapid growth of online 
platforms for advertising rental housing present significant opportunities for both good and ill. 
Websites like www.Craigslist.com allow property owners to advertise rental units with no paper 
work, on their own time, and at no cost. Not only does this make it easier to rent property, but it 
also saves landlords the significant commission paid to realtors to find tenant(s): commonly one 
to one-and-a-half month’s rent.  
These new landlords differ from traditional rental agents in important ways, however. Notably, 
many are part-time realtors/landlords who lack a real estate license. Unlike licensed realtors, 
these landlords are not trained or tested about fair housing law. These papers thus measure 
discrimination occurring across the broad spectrum of classes protected under U.S. fair housing 
law and test whether landlord behavior is influenced when provided with information about how 
fair housing law applies to rental housing.  
Measuring  Discrimination  
The first paper offers the first evidence of differential treatment occurring across the broad 
spectrum of racial and protected classes covered under the law. Employing a fully randomized 
correspondent audit design and a sample of more than 9,500 online housing advertisements, the 
study offers insight about which protected groups experience the most/least favorable treatment 
when searching for housing. Housing audits are an established research method designed to test 
for differential treatment of similar individuals who vary only according to a particular trait or 
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traits. Correspondence audits are a niche subset of audits in which email inquiries that are 
identical but for several key words or phrases are submitted to online advertisements for jobs, 
goods, or, in this case, rental housing.  
This study employs a new signaling strategy in order to provide the first evidence of how 
landlord treatment of rental housing applicants varies across the spectrum of protected classes. 
The findings suggest landlords have preferences about tenants and make decisions based on 
signals communicated in inquiry emails from potential applicants. Response rates to applicants 
from protected racial and ethnic subgroups align with previous studies, particularly those of 
Black and Arab males. Households with children, and even the potential for children, are also 
treated unfavorably.  
The findings also suggest differential treatment is generally consistent with theory of agent-based 
statistical discrimination. Landlords favor inquiries suggesting two potential earners over those 
mentioning only one individual or a home with children. Landlords also demonstrate an aversion 
to renters from groups associated with highly-publicized negative events, notably Arab males. 
These findings do not provide causal evidence about the landlord motivations for discriminating, 
only that the findings of discrimination are in agreement with the theory of agent-based statistical 
discrimination. 
The broad findings demonstrate that many groups in this country continue to face obstacles when 
searching for housing, despite decades of legislation and enforcement efforts. Many laws and 
enforcement mechanisms, however, are designed for housing searches conducted in-person and 
via newspaper and other print media. Rental housing searches have since migrated to online 
advertising platforms, yet the continued evidence of discrimination suggests laws may be 
outdated and enforcement mechanisms limited. Moving forward, scholarship should strive 
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understand how the online search for housing differs from the past and if laws and enforcement 
methods need to be modified for this new environment.  
Mitigating  Discrimination  
The second paper conducts an experiment designed to influence landlord behavior to increase 
equal treatment. The purpose is to test whether property owners and rental agents will change 
their behavior in response to being presented with information about their obligations under fair 
housing law. The primary hypothesis is that the “treatment” email will increase response rates to 
housing inquiries made by members of protected groups.   
The project thus conducts a randomized experiment employs a correspondence housing audit 
methodology to measure the impact. This research represents the first time in which the audit 
methodology is employed to measure the effect of a randomized experiment. The primary 
contribution of this paper, then, is to demonstrate a unique opportunity to test policy 
interventions aimed at reducing discrimination in a real housing market and at a very low cost. It 
is hoped that the method can be modified and expanded by fair housing agencies, advocates, and 
other institutions to test and implement policy interventions in hopes of reducing housing 
discrimination.  
The experiment creates a treatment group of randomly assigned Craigslist rental housing posts to 
send an informational email about fair housing law. The email is sent from a pseudonymous 
website (www.fairhousingawareness.org) created for the purposes of this experiment. The email 
includes specifics about how fair housing law applies to residential landlord and provides 
information about fair housing resources. The email is sent via marketing software that provides 
information about which recipients opened the email. 
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The correspondence audit method is then used as a means for testing whether the treatment email 
influences landlord behavior. Specifically, it is used to measure whether landlord response rates 
to applications inquiring about treated properties – those receiving fair housing info – differ from 
the response rate to those of untreated properties – those receiving no fair housing information. 
Differential response rates between the two groups of unit inquiries is interpreted as evidence of 
a treatment effect.  
The results of the experiment consistently suggest the group of landlords who received 
information about fair housing law responded at a higher rate than did those who did not receive 
the treatment email. Thus, the experiment offers evidence that utilizing the audit framework for 
testing policy interventions is a ripe opportunity for further research by scholars and 
practitioners. 
College  Scholarship  and  Urban  Revitalization  (Chapter  3)  
The third paper in this dissertation examines the impact of a place-based program on urban 
property values and school enrolments. A recent trend in place-based policy targets college 
attainment by offering tuition scholarships for qualified students in under-resourced public 
schools. In an era of rising college costs, these programs represent a potentially large financial 
benefit to those living within the attendance zones of qualifying schools. Being directly linked to 
attendance zones, the benefit of such programs should be capitalized into local property values 
and school district enrolment.  
This research thus examines the impact a large scholarship program, Say Yes to Education, has 
on property values in upstate New York. As “Say Yes” cities, students graduating from either the 
Buffalo or Syracuse city school districts who gain acceptance into one of more than one hundred 
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2-year and 4-year colleges and universities can receive up to 100% of tuition costs covered. 
Though the size of the benefit is tiered according to the number of years a student spends in the 
district, the only qualification is that they live in the district and attend public school.  
 
Examining	  district	  enrollment	  from	  2000	  through	  2014,	  the	  analysis	  finds	  that	  after	  years	  of	  steady	  
declines	  in	  enrollments,	  both	  Syracuse	  and	  Buffalo	  saw	  enrollment	  increases	  that	  coincide	  with	  the	  
adoption	  of	  the	  Say	  Yes	  to	  Education	  program.	  These	  increases	  occurred	  at	  different	  points	  in	  time	  in	  
each	  city.	  Over	  the	  same	  post-­‐treatment	  periods,	  enrollments	  continued	  to	  decline	  in	  the	  suburbs	  
surrounding	  these	  cities	  and	  in	  similar	  upstate	  New	  York	  city	  school	  districts	  without	  the	  program,	  
suggesting	  that	  these	  increases	  were	  city-­‐specific	  and	  not	  due	  to	  broader	  developments	  affecting	  the	  
region.	  	  
	  
To	  isolate	  the	  impact	  of	  Say	  Yes	  on	  housing	  prices,	  a	  panel	  data	  set	  of	  individual	  home	  sales	  is	  used	  to	  
estimate	  hedonic	  price	  models	  that	  control	  for	  neighborhood	  fixed	  effects	  and	  trends.	  The	  results	  
provide	  some	  evidence	  that	  increases	  in	  housing	  prices	  accompanied	  the	  adoption	  of	  Say	  Yes	  in	  
Syracuse,	  but	  not	  in	  Buffalo.	  These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  enrollment	  growth	  in	  Buffalo	  
may	  have	  been	  driven	  by	  students	  who	  would	  otherwise	  have	  attended	  private	  schools,	  while	  
enrollment	  growth	  in	  Syracuse	  may	  have	  been	  driven	  by	  students	  who	  would	  otherwise	  have	  attended	  
school	  in	  the	  surrounding	  suburbs.	  Combined	  with	  the	  enrolment	  effects,	  the	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  the	  
ability	  of	  place-­‐based	  scholarships	  to	  attract	  residents	  into	  a	  central	  city	  is	  likely	  to	  depend	  on	  both	  the	  
specific	  provisions	  of	  the	  program	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  implemented.	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Chapter 1 
 
Up-Hill Battles: 
Testing for Rental Housing Discrimination across the Spectrum of U.S. Protected Classes 
Introduction 
Federal fair housing law in the United States prohibits discrimination in housing based on race, 
color, gender, family status, and religion. Many state and local governments have extended these 
protections to cover sexual identity as well. Despite these laws, studies continue to identify 
statistically significant levels of discrimination in rental housing markets. Most large-scale 
efforts focus on race and ethnic discrimination, including gender, though several recent studies 
have examined discrimination based on sexual preferences, source of income, and disability. To 
date, however, no single study has looked at differential treatment across the broad spectrum of 
racial and protected classes covered under the law. 
This study contributes to the discrimination literature in three primary ways. First, the study 
offers the first evidence of how the frequency of discrimination occurs across the spectrum of 
protected classes included under U.S. fair housing law. Employing a fully randomized 
correspondence audit design and a sample of more than 9,500 online housing advertisements, the 
study offers insight about which protected groups experience the most/least favorable treatment 
when searching for housing. Second, the audit employs signals indicating race and group 
membership that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, have not been previously used in 
housing audits. Specifically, by pairing slight variations in the body text of the email with 
quotations signaling group membership in the signature line, each landlord receives a single 
inquiry containing at least two signals of protected group membership. Third, the randomized 
design with multiple protected groups allows for interactions among protected classes, offering 
support for theories about the mechanisms motivating differential treatment by landlords. 
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Testing for Discrimination 
Studying rental housing discrimination generally employs the use of a field experiment referred 
to as a housing audit. These experiments are designed to test whether landlord treatment of a 
base group (typically the dominant ethnicity or class) differs from landlord treatment of one or 
more sub-dominant groups (minorities or vulnerable populations). These experiments can be 
conducted in-person, over the phone, or via the internet through email and online advertisements. 
The findings of these studies have proven convincing, having been upheld in court cases 
prosecuting landlords who discriminate against housing applicants.1 
In-Person Audits 
Traditional housing audits are in-person experiments in which trained actors inquire about and 
apply for a housing unit advertised in a local newspaper. Actors are paired and adopt similar 
profiles along common traits that might influence a landlord’s housing decision, such as age, 
education, income, family status, appearance, current residence, and more. Great care is taken to 
minimize any differences other than the trait being tested, typically race, color or ethnic 
background. The actors carefully record how they are treated, including whether they are shown 
the unit originally inquired about, how many units are presented to them, and the location of the 
units shown.  
The most comprehensive and influential in-person audits are the Housing Discrimination Studies 
(HDS) that have been conducted by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) roughly once every decade since 1977. These studies find consistent levels of rental 
discrimination against minorities in both the advertised unit being available and whether the 
minority auditor was invited to inspect additional units. Discrimination is consistently present 
among African American and Latino Americans, though levels decline over time. In addition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Oh and Yinger (2015) for discussion of court cases. 
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the national studies, dozens of smaller studies have been conducted. Oh and Yinger (2015) 
provide a detailed literature review of these and other such studies. 
Despite their influence, in-person audits have several limitations. The most prohibitive is their 
cost. Finding, hiring and training a sufficient number of actors to reveal statistically significant 
measures of discrimination is very expensive. As a result, only a handful of national in-person 
audits exist, each having been funded by the federal government.  
A second issue refers to concerns about the reliability of the discrimination estimates. Noted by 
Heckman and Siegelman (1993), trained actors may be primed to identify discriminatory 
behavior, thus upwardly biasing the estimate of discrimination. While those conducting in-
person audits attempt to mitigate this concern with good actors and training, this concern 
continues to be raised when evaluating measures of discrimination from in-person audits.  
Email Correspondence Audits 
More recently, the increased use of the Internet as a platform for buying and selling has opened 
up a new mechanism through which discrimination can be both practiced and measured. 
Websites, such as Craigslist.com, allow landlords and rental agents to anonymously post 
available housing units and conduct introductory screening via email correspondence, often 
using randomly generated, temporary email addresses. This complete anonymity provides a 
forum through which landlords and agents can choose to discriminate with little to no risk of 
being identified. Simultaneously, however, the anonymity of these online marketplaces create an 
extraordinary opportunity for fair housing advocates and researchers to test for discrimination, 
known as correspondence audits.  
By posing as interested applicants, testers make email inquiries about advertised housing units 
with names and other signals that are commonly associated with particular ethnic or 
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demographic characteristics. The outcome measure is landlord response rates, in which the base 
group, typically whites, is compared with the minority group being tested. The outcome is a 
narrower measure of discrimination than an in-person audit, however, as it can only test for 
differential response rates to email inquiries. Much of the nuance provided during in-person 
audits is lost, and steering, a practice in which property owners steer particular customer groups 
away/towards particular neighborhoods is unable to be assessed. The benefit, however, is that 
these correspondence studies can be conducted at a much lower cost while avoiding the risk of 
actor-influenced results as noted earlier.  
Carpusor and Loges (2006) were the first to apply the correspondence email method to the study 
of housing discrimination, examining African and Arab-Americans in Los Angeles in the period 
surrounding the United States declaration of war in Iraq. Following their lead, researchers have 
conducted additional audits in Sweden (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008), Norway and the UK 
(Carlsson & Eriksson, 2014), Spain (Bosch, Carnero, & Farre, 2010), Italy (Baldini & Federici, 
2011), the United States (Hanson & Hawley, 2011) and elsewhere, each finding discrimination to 
exist between dominant majorities and ethnic minorities.   
Audit Designs: Matched-Pair vs. Fully-Randomized 
The two primary methods for conducting audits are matched-pair and fully-random designs. The 
key distinction between the designs is whether a single landlord receives one or multiple 
inquiries about a housing advertisement. In a matched-pair framework, virtually identical 
inquiries are made to the same landlord from two different actors (in-person) or email profiles 
(correspondence). Testers then compare differential response rates within each landlord included 
in the sample. Under a fully randomized design, each landlord receives only a single inquiry, 
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leaving testers to compare differential response rates across all landlords in the sample. Selecting 
which framework to employ thus has important consequences for researchers. 
Matched-pair audits are most common for both in-person and correspondence audits for several 
reasons. A key strength of a matched-pair design is that the within comparison allows a 
researcher to control for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of each landlord or rental 
agent. This offers at least two important benefits. First, it greatly reduces the number of landlords 
needed to achieve statistically significant results, as each landlord represents multiple 
observations. Given the limited resources available to fair housing advocates and scholars, this is 
a tremendous advantage.  
An additional benefit of a matched pair design is the power of the narrative offered by the 
results. Perhaps the most striking example of this found in the literature is in Hanson, Hawley, 
and Taylor (2011) in which landlord responses, rather than response rates, are analyzed. The 
authors motivate their paper with the actual email responses of a single landlord to inquiries from 
a black and a white male. In response to Tremayne Williams, a black male, the landlord writes 
“work ref. rental ref. name address ss#". In contrast, the same landlord responds to Brett Murphy 
with “its avail give me your # and I will have my daughter show it to you.” Clearly, the narrative 
power of such different responses from the same landlord is valuable.    
Despite the practical, statistical, and narrative advantages of a matched-pair design, employing a 
paired design involves several important trade-offs. The most important trade-off in a matched-
pair design is that sending multiple inquiries to a single landlord risks detection of the audit. 
Detection occurs when a one or more landlords become suspicious after multiple inquiries about 
the unit appear similar. Most paired audits take steps to minimize the risk of detection, such as 
presenting slightly different incomes, careers, or emails, though each difference is made in 
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addition to the racial or demographic background of the applicant. Each additional difference 
between the pairs, other than the signal, has the potential to introduce bias and/or reduce the 
power of the narrative. Researchers must thus be careful so that these differences do not interact 
with the primary signal being communicated in the audit.  
Employing a fully randomized design overcomes some key limitations in a matched-pair audit. 
By sending only a single email response to each housing post, detection risk in randomized 
audits is greatly reduced. Barring landlords sharing and comparing inquiries with other landlords 
via an online forum, it is difficult to think of a realistic scenario in which a randomized audit 
might be detected. Further, the negligible detection risk allows the inquiries to be identical, but 
for the signal(s) used to communicate race or group status. This ensures any measure of 
discrimination is identified only by the signals being communicated in the email.  
Selecting to use a randomized design comes at the expense of the powerful narrative and smaller 
sample of landlords offered by the matched-pair framework. Rather than comparing treatment 
within landlords, the randomized design compares treatment across the distribution of landlords. 
This requires a larger sample and eliminates the ability to control for unobserved landlord 
characteristics through the use of a fixed effect.   
Ultimately, the decision to employ a matched-pair or a fully randomized design depends on the 
nature of each project and the hypotheses being tested in each audit. All known in-person audits 
have been matched-pair designs, likely due to historical precedent and lower costs, though no 
theoretical reason prevents a randomized in-person audit. Correspondence audits have employed 
both. Matched-pair audits are more common, as might be expected, including Hanson and 
Hawley (2011), Ahmed and Hammerstedt (2010), Schwegman (2017), among others. 
Randomized designs exist as well, including the first-published correspondence audit by 
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Carpusor and Loges (2006). Following them, Ahmed, Andersson, and Hammerstedt (2010) and 
Ewens, Tomlin, and Wang (2014) have also employed a fully-randomized methodology.  
Evidence of Discrimination 
Evidence from housing audits consistently find discrimination along race and ethnic lines. The 
national HDS studies have found discrimination against blacks since 1977. While measures of 
discrimination have declined over time, the 2012 HDS found black renters were told of and 
shown fewer available unit and quoted slightly higher rents than whites. Though narrower in 
scope, a review of published correspondence audits since 2006 also find blacks to receive lower 
response rates to inquiry emails than whites (Carpusor & Loges, 2006); (Hanson & Hawley, 
2011); (Ewens, Tomlin, & Wang, 2014).  
Latinos have faced consistent unfavorable treatment when compared to whites in the HDS 
findings since first included in the 1989 study. Latinos are told of and shown fewer available 
units than whites, and they are also quoted higher rents. In the correspondence literature, 
however, a study by Hanson and Santas (2014) reveal nuance exists within discriminatory 
practices towards Latinos. The authors conduct a paired correspondence audit testing landlord 
response rates to inquires from whites, “assimilated” Latinos, and recent immigrants. 
Assimilated Latino’s are signaled using assimilated first names (i.e. Alex, Jonathan, Anthony) 
and single Latino surnames (Lopez, Gonzales, Garcia). Recently immigrated Latinos are signaled 
with more traditional names (i.e. Ruben, Oscar, Andre) and double surnames (i.e. Ramirez 
Chacon, Medina Rios), as is the norm in many Spanish speaking countries. The analysis finds 
discrimination towards more recently immigrated Latinos, but not the “assimilated” Latinos.   
Carpusor and Loges (2006) provide the only evidence of discrimination towards Arabs in a U.S.-
based correspondence study, finding Arabic males to experience lower response rates compared 
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with whites, though higher rates than blacks. Outside of the U.S., however, multiple studies find 
less favorable treatment of Arabs in comparison with native populations in Canada (Hogan & 
Berry, 2011) Scandinavia (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008) (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt, 
2010) (Andersson, Jakobsson, & Kotsadam, 2012) (Carlsson & Eriksson, 2014), the United 
Kingdom (Carlsson and Ericksson, 2013), Italy (Baldini & Federici, 2011), and Spain (Bosch, 
Carnero, & Farre, 2010). 
Despite a considerable literature measuring race- and ethnicity-based discrimination, few 
correspondence audits have examined differential treatment of other vulnerable populations. 
Women have been included in several correspondence studies – Andersson, Jakobsson, and 
Kotsadam (2012), Bosch, Carnero, and Farre (2010), Ewens, Tomlin and Wong (2014) – but 
with the exception of Andersson et al, the primary focus of these has been to compare 
differential treatment of race, not gender. For example, Ewens et al (2014) include gender in a 
randomized correspondence audit, though the emphasis of the project focuses on testing causes 
of race-based discrimination and minimal analysis by gender is discussed. Andersson et al (2012) 
test for differences between race and gender in Norway, concluding that females are given 
preferential treatment and that race is the primary mechanism through which discrimination is 
practiced. Studies including gender compare black and white in the U.S. (Ewens, Tomlin, & 
Wang, 2014), and native Swedes (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008), Norwegians (Andersson, 
Jakobsson, & Kotsadam, 2012) or Spanish (Bosch, Carnero, & Farre, 2010) with Muslims.  
Sexuality, family status, and religion are also under-represented in the U.S. literature. Two 
unpublished correspondence studies have examined sexuality-based discrimination. A 2013 
study commissioned by the Urban Institute and conducted by Freidman (2013) employs a 
matched-pair correspondence audit to examine differential treatment of homosexual and 
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heterosexual couples across 50 randomly selected MSAs. The authors employ a matched-pair 
design and find landlords across the country to prefer heterosexual couples to either gay or 
lesbian couples. Schwegman (2017) conducts a similar study and finds similar preferences 
among U.S. landlords. Outside of the U.S., however, Ahmed, Andersson and Hammarstedt find 
that Scandinavian landlords are generally neutral about same-sex couples (2008).  
To date, no known academic study has focused on either family status or religion. Evidence from 
small-scale local audits performed by fair housing advocates suggests discrimination exists 
towards families with children. A 2014 study performed by the Denver Metro Fair Housing 
Center found discrimination towards families with children at rates similar to blacks and 
Latinos.2 A similar study conducted in 2016 by the Seattle Office for Civil Rights found families 
with children to be treated less favorably than childless renters.3 Religion-based discrimination is 
even less explored. While studies have considered discrimination against Arab sounding names, 
it is unknown whether this treatment is motivated by ethnic or religious stereotypes about Islam.  
A final note about existing studies is worth discussing. Many correspondence audits are paired 
audits. In paired-audits, identification of differential treatment is measured within each 
individual landlord. Thus, most audits rightfully place significant focus on the ability to compare 
like groups (i.e. gay couples with straight couples, white males with black males, etc.). Put 
differently, a study examining discrimination towards blacks that compares black women to 
white men confounds identification, as both racial and gender differences exist between the 
groups. Thus, matched designs isolate differences by comparing black males with white males, 
gay couples with straight couples, etc.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2014/02/05/study-finds-rampant-discrimination-in.html 
3 http://westseattleblog.com/2016/05/evidence-of-housing-discrimination-alleged-in-test-results-from-23-properties-citywide-including-3-in-
west-seattle/ 
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What previous studies have not done, however, is assess how much overall discrimination exists 
as the law defines it. Fair housing law makes unequal treatment on the grounds of race, ethnicity, 
gender, family status, religion or sexuality illegal. The only group falling outside of that 
definition is white males. Thus, to the extent that any group covered under the law receives 
differential treatment from white males, it can be considered evidence of discrimination. It is 
thus the hope of this project to offer insight about how much discrimination occurs by race and 
protected class relative to the dominant group.  
Experimental Design 
The objective of this audit study is to measure discrimination as it occurs across the spectrum of 
protected classes covered by U.S. Fair Housing Law. Federal, state and local housing laws 
require landlords treat all applicants equally, regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, 
sexuality4, and family status. To estimate discrimination across a broad range of protected 
classes, this research employs a randomized correspondence audit design using housing units 
posted on Craigslist in the 20 most populated U.S. cities. Were no discrimination to exist, each 
group would have an equal likelihood of receiving a response to housing inquiries. 
This experiment employs a methodology similar to the randomized audits of Carpusor and Loges 
(2006) and Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008). The decision to employ a randomized instead of a 
matched-pair design for this study was driven by two primary factors. First, because little work 
has been done to identify discrimination by group membership, the decision was made that 
emails should be identical in syntax, with the exception being the particular signal(s) 
communicated in each inquiry. This ensures the detection of differential treatment is being 
identified by the signal alone, rather than subtle differences in the construction of the email. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 State and local level only (19 of 20 cities in my sample) 
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Because using identical emails increases detection risk, a randomized design was therefore 
employed.  
Central to an effective correspondence audit design is communicating group status through 
signals included in each email inquiry. The randomized design allows a nearly identical syntax 
be used for all emails, the base form of which is included below. Each email asks about the 
availability of the unit, provides information about who is interested in the unit, mentions 
potentially attractive personal habits, and volunteers a recent credit report. A second version of 
the email, written in more casual language, includes several grammatical errors to provide a level 
of social-class variation in the experiment.   
 
Dear sir/madam, 
[Body Signal 1] I am interested in the rental unit posted on Craigslist, is it still available? I have 
good references, don’t drink or smoke [Body Signal 2], and am happy to send a copy of a recent 
credit report.  
Regards, 
[First name] [Last name] 
[Signal Quotation]  
 
Following previous studies, race, ethnicity and gender were signaled using names commonly 
associated with a particular ethnicity or gender. One difference from previous correspondence 
studies in the U.S. is that multiple races and ethnicities are included for which limited name data 
exists in the U.S., particularly for those of Arab descent. Thus, first names were selected for all 
races from websites listing common names for different groups. Surnames used for whites and 
blacks came from Bertrand and Mullinathian (2004), while Latinos and Middle-Eastern names 
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were constructed in similar fashion to the first names. (Table 1) To mitigate potential concerns 
about what is inferred from names constructed in this manner, a second and more direct signal is 
also used in the signature line of each email to communicate group membership (described 
below). 
Beyond race and gender, it is not possible to signal protected group membership using a name. 
Signals must therefore be communicated in a manner that might reasonably be included in an 
introductory email inquiry for housing. Membership was thus signaled in the body of each email, 
by slightly modifying the base email to suggest group membership. (Table 2) Signaling 
sexuality, for example, “My partner and I” is inserted to [Body Signal 1] to introduce who is 
inquiring about the unit.5 Signaling religion is done in [Body Signal 2], by adding the phrase 
“due to my Islamic(Christian) beliefs” as the motivation for not drinking and smoking.  
To ensure at least two signals for group membership are included for each group, an additional 
signal is provided in the signature line of each email inquiry. (Table 3) Continuing with the 
religion example, Christian and Islamic variations of the “Golden Rule” were included.6 
Quotations signaling race, gender, sexuality and family status are also used. (Table 4) This 
additional signal is used to increase the probability that the landlord identifies the email inquiry 
as being sent from someone in a particular group.  
Though the use of the body and quotation signals allows additional groups to be included in the 
audit, their use may limit the generalizability of the study. It is unknown how frequently 
individuals utilize quotations in the signature line of emails or reference characteristics about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Signaling sexuality as couples creates a group that is different than the base group in an important and meaningful way. By signaling couple 
status, it suggests the potential for two earners in the house, rather than the base inquiry with no signal of a partner. As the study does not include 
a comparable straight couple, this leaves open the question of whether differential treatment is driven by sexuality or multiple incomes. Tables 9 
and 13 address this, however, and reveal differential treatment of gay couples, especially among non-whites, is unlikely to be driven by income.  
6 Iterations of each email are included in the appendix 
18	  
	  
themselves in inquiry emails. Landlords may thus view such emails as unusual, potentially 
affecting response rates.7 Thus, the results may represent differential treatment of a subset of 
potential housing applicants, though the estimates remain unbiased as all groups include body 
and email signals. This limitation was accepted in order to provide the first evidence of 
discrimination across the spectrum of protected classes.  
Sample Characteristics 
Craigslist is an ideal venue to conduct a correspondence audit for several reasons. It offers a 
local webpage in nearly every city in the U.S., receives a high volume of traffic, is free to use for 
both landlords and renters, and employs an identical format across all U.S. apartment rental sites. 
More than 50 billion page views occur globally each year, and 60 million people use Craigslist 
each month in the U.S. alone.8 Of particular attractiveness to audit studies is that the format for 
housing posts is identical across all U.S. sites, allowing unit-specific data to be gathered in a 
consistent manner across all cities.  
Units were randomly selected on each day of the week and inquiry emails were submitted within 
24 hours of being posted on Craigslist. Posts were collected from each city in batches of 100 
using a semi-automated process.9 Extensive effort was made to avoid sending inquiries to 
landlords posting multiple units. The de-duplicating process began by eliminating units sharing 
the same Craigslist ID, address, phone number, realty company, or housing development. Next, 
individual unit advertisements were scanned for similar characteristics that suggested a shared 
landlord. Landlords commonly use the same format for multiple posts, similar marketing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is difficult to compare the response rate in this study with those in the literature. The response rate is slightly lower (3-8%) to Hanson and 
Santas () and Hanson and Taylor (), though they use a matched pair design so each landlord has multiple emails contributing to the response rate. 
Differences in market conditions may also play a role, as their audits were conducted 3 and 7 years prior.  
8 Source: https://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet 
9 The collection process employed a program written by Phil Murchie. The program provides a semi-automated process for gathering unit 
information and contacting landlords. Without this tool, the data gathering process would have been significantly more cumbersome.   
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phrases, company logos, and other practices. Any unit raising even the slightest doubt was 
eliminated. Finally, posts were compared with a master-file of all previously de-duplicated posts 
and a second round of de-duplication was conducted. In total, more than 15,000 units were 
deleted using this process. 
Each post received a single email indicating interest in the unit from one of 24 names varying by 
race and gender and of the form first.last####@gmail.com. Each inquiry was then randomly 
assigned group membership for one of 8 additional profiles. Names were used to identify race, 
ethnic group and gender, while group status was signaled in the body and signature line of each 
email. The first emails were sent July 25th, 2016 and responses were recorded until September 
19th, 2016, which was two weeks after the final inquiries were sent. 
In total, this experiment sampled 9,672 units. The overall response rate of landlords to inquiries 
was 36.1%. Table 6 specifies the number of audits and response rate for each city. The variation 
in the number of audits across cities is driven by the frequency of duplicate landlords identified 
at the time data was collected from Craigslist. Professional realtors who posted multiple 
properties at a time dominated the Chicago, Dallas, and Miami markets. Conversely, Boston, 
Seattle, Minneapolis and San Diego had a much higher percentage of individual landlords 
advertising housing on Craigslist.  The highest response rate was 43.3% in Denver, while 
Phoenix had the lowest rate at 26.1%.  
Unit information was available for the vast majority of units sampled, and included the size, 
square footage, type of building and monthly rent (Table 5). The monthly rent, unit type, number 
of bedrooms and number of bathrooms was available for more than 95% of units. Square footage 
was available less frequently, for 67% of units. The average unit had 2 bedrooms, 1.5 baths, 
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slightly more than 1,200 square feet and was listed with a monthly rent of $1,835. Roughly 62% 
of the sample is listed as an apartment and 20% as single-family homes.  
Rents were highest in San Francisco and New York City and least expensive in Detroit and St. 
Louis. More than 70% of postings in New York City (95%), Boston (81%), Dallas (74%) and 
Washington D.C (71%) were for apartments. Conversely, Detroit (44%), Riverside (41%), and 
St. Louis (32%) each had 30% or more posts for houses. Washington D.C. (1,017 sq. ft. ) and 
New York City (1,067 sq. ft.) had the smallest average unit size, Houston and Riverside with the 
largest. 
A final note about the sample. Rental agents and landlords using Craigslist have the option to 
either provide a personal email or be assigned a temporary and anonymous Craigslist-generated 
email address. The overwhelming majority of landlords, roughly 90% in the sample, choose 
anonymity. Response rates for this group of landlords were as much as 10% lower than among 
those who provided identifiable email addresses. 
Empirical Results 
Table 7 presents the raw number of audits and the landlord response rate by race, across 
protected classes. Among racial and ethnic groups, Latinos (39.5%) and Whites (38.1%) 
experienced the highest response rates, while Black and Arab emails received the lowest rate. 
Emails from females (38.4%) had higher response rates than those from males (35.9 %). Male 
gay couples received the highest overall response rate for protected groups at 44.5%, while 
single parents experienced the lowest response rate at 35.1%.  
Among racial subgroups, white gay couples received the highest response rate of all sub-group 
categories at 55.6%, while Arab males and Black single parents were the only two groups to 
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receive responses to fewer than 30% of inquiries. The response rate for emails from Latinos is 
above the group average for all categories except gay males (39.5% vs 44.5%), while blacks 
receive lower than average responses in all categories. Females experience higher response rates 
than males for all groups except Latinos, with Arab females having a 12% higher response rate 
than Arab males. 
Table 8 presents the results from a linear probability model. White males without a protected 
group signal are the omitted group, as they represent the dominant group and are not generally 
considered a protected class. Coefficients thus represent differential treatment of a particular race 
or protected group relative to white males. Column 1 presents the base model, without unit 
controls or city dummies.  
The overall results are consistent with the raw averages discussed above. Blacks (-6.2%), Arabs 
(-4.7%), single parents (-4.2%), and Muslims (-3.8 %) receive statistically significant lower 
landlord response rates than white males. Inquiries from gay males (6.2%) and females (1.9%) 
received statistically significant higher response rates. Response to grammatically correct and 
formal emails were 4.2% higher, and landlords providing an identifiable email address were 
11.1% more likely to respond. The response rate to Latino, Lesbian, and Christian inquiries are 
not statistically different from white males.  
Columns 2 and 3 add unit controls and city dummies. Adding city controls has little effect, 
suggesting time invariant differences across cities has little impact on landlord response rates. 
Column 3 adds unit controls, thus reducing the sample by one-third. It is worth noting that doing 
so also changes the composition of the sample, by restricting it to the group of landlords who 
provide more unit information in their advertisement.  
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The intercept for the restricted group is 6-8 percentage points higher than that in Columns 1 and 
2, suggesting these landlords are generally more responsive than the overall sample. The signs in 
Column 3 are consistent with Columns 1 and 2, however, though the magnitude and significance 
levels differ slightly. The coefficient on Latino (3.5%) is more than double that in column 1 and 
becomes significant at the 5% level. Lower response rates for Muslims also increase in both 
magnitude and precision.  
The randomized design and inclusion of protected classes in addition to race allows for analyzing 
the relationship between race and group status in a way that has not previously been tested in the 
literature. Specifically, it offers insight into how protected group status varies within each racial 
group. For example, do all single parents face differential treatment or is it only those of a 
particular race?  
Table 9 examines how providing information about the group status of a respondent affects the 
likelihood of receiving a response within each racial group.10  Specifically, the coefficients 
represent differential treatment of particular protected groups compared with males of the same 
race or ethnicity. The intent is to examine how treatment of each protected class varies within 
each racial group. Column 1 presents the results from the base model (Table 8) for reference. 
Table 9 shows landlords are likely to respond similarly to White applicants, though a clear 
preference for gay couples is evident. Among Latinos, landlords indicate clear preferences for 
men, with both females and single parent applicants receiving statistically significant lower 
response rates. In contrast, landlords have strong preferences for females, gay and lesbian 
couples over males.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Column 1 presents the results from the base model in Table 8 for reference. 
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In contrast with other ethnicities, treatment of protected groups does not vary within black 
housing applicants. All subgroups of blacks are treated in a similar fashion to black males. Said 
differently, simply being black is signal enough to receive a lower response rate from landlords. 
There is no additional benefit or penalty received by providing additional information about ones 
group membership. Even a grammatically correct email fails to make a significantly different 
effect on landlord response rates to black applicants.   
Discussion 
This paper presents findings from a correspondence housing audit that incorporates both race and 
protected class in a single, randomized project. The results provide evidence that many groups 
protected under U.S. fair housing law continue to face obstacles when searching for housing in 
spite of decades of fair housing law. In order to design more effective policy, then, a better 
understanding of the drivers of discrimination is required.  
Two primary hypotheses about the causes of discrimination exist in the literature. The first, 
prejudicial discrimination, refers to differential treatment driven by a landlord’s dislike or 
distaste for the particular group being discriminated against (Yinger 1986). These landlords 
elevate their personal prejudicial attitude over that of a profit motivation, but short of a survey 
revealing landlord preferences, this discrimination is very difficult to identify.  
Profit motivation is the foundation for the second hypothesis, also known as statistical 
discrimination (Yinger 1986). Statistical discrimination refers to discrimination in which being a 
minority or a member of a protected-class serves as a proxy for profitability risk due to limited 
information about the applicant. For example, a landlord may view applicant membership to a 
group with high levels of low-income or unemployed people as a threat to the applicant’s ability 
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pay rent in a timely manner. Similarly, applicants with children may represent higher risk of 
damage to the unit, again threatening profitability. In this agent-based discrimination, then, the 
landlord is acting to protect profit based on perceptions correlated with the known characteristics 
of an applicant. Limited information, however, does not justify discrimination as defined by the 
law.  
A second form of statistical discrimination is that in which a landlord or agent engages in 
discrimination to protect a client base. Landlords and agents may have existing clients with 
preferences for neighbors that fit a certain profile. Examples of this include not renting to a 
minority in a homogenous dominant-group neighborhood or renting to families with children 
when single young adults occupy other units in a particular building. In this customer-based 
discrimination, the landlord is acting so as to not offend an existing client base and threaten 
future profits. Ultimately, whether the cause of differential treatment is prejudicial or statistical, 
it is illegal.  
A number of studies have sought to examine the causes of race-based discrimination found in 
audit studies, though they are largely limited to indirect attempts that test hypotheses about the 
likelihood of a cause under particular circumstances. Correspondence studies by Bosch, Carnero, 
and Farre (2010), Hanson and Hawley (2011), Ondrich, Ross, & Yinger (2003) and Ewens, 
Tomlin, and Wang (2014) test for statistical discrimination by offering additional applicant 
information. Such information includes employment type (Bosch et al, 2010), personal behaviors 
(Ewens et al, 2014), and well-written emails (Hanson and Hawley 2011), finding differential 
treatment is lower as additional positive information is provided. Yinger, Ondrich and Ross 
(2003) and Hanson and Hawley (2011) find evidence of steering, by exploiting information 
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about individual units, applicants, and neighborhood characteristics. Additional detail about the 
causes of discrimination is discussed at length in Oh and Yinger (2015). 
A common challenge faced by all audit studies is to move beyond measuring discrimination and 
test causes of what motivates differential treatment of particular groups. This study faces these 
same limitations, though the ability to examine race and group membership in a randomized 
design allows for some examination of statistical discrimination that has not been possible in 
previous designs. Specifically, by interacting race and ethnicity with other protected classes, the 
design allows for some tests about the extent that differential treatment by race is motivated by 
landlord stereotypes about particular groups.  
Evidence of Statistical Discrimination? 
Examining differences in the earning potential of applicants allows for a relatively 
straightforward test of statistical discrimination. For example, the design of the signal for gay 
and lesbian couples suggests the potential for multiple earners, as the email begins “My partner 
and I”. In contrast, male, female, and religious applicants make no mention of a second potential 
income, simply indicating the applicant’s individual interest in the unit. The single parent signal 
also offers no mention of another potential earner, but provides information about additional 
demands for income, namely children. If landlords are practicing agent-based statistical 
discrimination, then, gay couples should receive more favorable treatment than single applicants, 
while both should receive more favorable treatment than single parents.  
The results in Table 8 are thus generally consistent with agent-based statistical discrimination 
described above. Notably deviating from this theory, however, is that lesbian couples do not 
receive as favorable treatment as gay couples. As the signal for both gay men and lesbians 
suggests the possibility of two earners, can other differences explain these results? Put 
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differently, to be consistent with statistical discrimination, differential treatment of the groups 
must be explained by other traits that are correlated with profitability.  
One possible explanation of the differential treatment is the propensity for having children. 
Nearly 25% of gay and lesbian couples have children,11 though lesbian couples are much more 
likely to have children than men. Further, a 2015 Demography article by Alden, Edlund, 
Hammarstedt, and Mueller-Smith (2015) finds the primary drivers of marriage among gay and 
lesbian couples differ dramatically. For gay couples, pooling resources is the dominant 
motivation while family formation brings lesbian couples together in marriage. Pop-culture 
stereotypes of gay couples include tidy apartments and dual incomes with no children,12 traits 
that also suggest more resources and fewer obligations when rent comes due and greater 
attentiveness in caring for the unit. If landlords are aware of or make similar distinctions about 
gay and lesbian couples, the differential treatment between the groups of renters is consistent 
with statistical discrimination. 
Table 8 indicates an overall positive effect of being gay, while Table 9 suggests this varies by 
race. Table 10 therefore takes the analysis further and presents the interaction of race with 
sexuality. If the signal for being gay is associated with the potential for multiple incomes, the 
interactions should have a positive association across all races. If the effect varies by race, 
however, being gay may signal more than income. 
The results in Table 10 and Table 11 suggest that treatment of gay males varies by race, though it 
is generally positive. Gay white males receive a 15.6% higher response rate than white men with 
no signal, the highest response rate of any group in the audit. Black and Arab gay men also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/MarriageandFamily.pdf 
12 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/murray-lipp/gay-men-myths-stereotypes_b_3463172.html 
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receive a higher response than single males, offsetting the negative treatment of being a Black or 
Arab male relative to a White male identified in Table 8. The response rate for Latino gay 
couples is similar to single Latino males. 
The findings in Table 10 and Table 11 are largely consistent with agent-based statistical 
discrimination, though the variation across race suggests additional factors associated with race 
and/or sexuality exist. For example, the discussion about differences between Arab males and 
females discussed below may also apply to Arab gay couples. Despite this evidence, these and 
other reasons for this differential treatment likely reflect factors that are unable to be addressed 
in this study.  
Another opportunity to test for statistical discrimination is among females. Theories about 
statistical discrimination and landlord treatment of female applicants in a correspondence audit 
are ambiguous. On one hand, females may be associated with higher potential for children than 
males, thus representing an obligation on their income and greater risk to profitability. 
Conversely, however, females may be awarded stereotypes about being more clean, hosting 
fewer parties, among myriad other factors that may reduce threats to landlord profitability. Thus 
to better understand the positive effect in Table 8, Table 12 presents the interaction of race and 
gender. 
 
Table 12 reveals that women of all races do not universally share the positive effect of being 
female in there housing searches. Instead, being female is not significantly different from males 
for White, Black and Latino applicants. For Arab women, however, there is a large and 
significant positive effect relative to Arab males. The effect offsets the entire negative effect of 
being a single Arab male. When considering the similar preferences for Arab gay couples 
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discussed above, a reasonable explanation for the differential treatment of these groups within 
the Arab community is consistent with statistical discrimination.  
This audit took place from July-September, 2016. In the six weeks preceding the start of the 
study, male perpetrators of Arab descent carried out high-profile acts of violence on the Pulse 
nightclub in Orlando, Florida and the Bastille Day celebration in Nice, France. The attacks 
received worldwide attention and became frequently discussed events during the U.S. 
presidential election. The perpetrator of the Nice, France attack, Mohammed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, 
shared the first name of one of the Arab males included in this study. Given the relative 
proximity of these attacks and the timing of the audit, it is reasonable to think landlords looked 
for signals in inquiries from Arab applicants and gave preferential treatment to those subgroups 
they believed were less likely to be associated with acts of violence committed by men of Arab 
descent.  
If Arab females are driving the positive effects of being female in Table 8, the findings in Table 
12 are consistent with the theory of statistical discrimination. As discussed above, the theory is 
ambiguous as to whether females make better tenants than males, and the findings support this. 
The only group for which being female has an effect is Arab women, of which the timing of the 
study and perceptions of Arab males may well be driving the differential treatment.  
Conclusions and Further Opportunities for Research 
This study employs a new signaling strategy in order to provide the first evidence of how 
landlord treatment of rental housing applicants varies across the spectrum of protected classes. 
The findings suggest landlords have preferences about tenants and make decisions based on 
signals communicated in inquiry emails from potential applicants. Response rates to applicants 
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from protected racial and ethnic subgroups align with previous studies, particularly those of 
Black and Arab males. Households with children, and even the potential for children, are also 
treated unfavorably.  
The findings also suggest differential treatment is generally consistent with theory of agent-based 
statistical discrimination. Landlords favor inquiries suggesting two potential earners over those 
mentioning only one individual or a home with children. Landlords also demonstrate an aversion 
to renters from groups associated with highly-publicized negative events, notably Arab males. 
These findings do not provide causal evidence about the landlord motivations for discriminating, 
only that the findings of discrimination are in agreement with the theory of agent-based statistical 
discrimination. 
The broad findings demonstrate that many groups in this country continue to face obstacles when 
searching for housing, despite decades of legislation and enforcement efforts. Many laws and 
enforcement mechanisms, however, are designed for housing searches conducted in-person and 
via newspaper and other print media. Rental housing searches have since migrated to online 
advertising platforms, yet the continued evidence of discrimination suggests laws may be 
outdated and enforcement mechanisms limited. Moving forward, scholarship should strive 
understand how the online search for housing differs from the past and if laws and enforcement 
methods need to be modified for this new environment.  
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Table 1: Male names used in audit 
  
  
Number of 
Emails 
Percentage of 
emails Race 
    Abdul Abbas 384 3.97 Arab 
Mohammed Toosi 367 3.98 Arab 
Saied Ardakani 485 5.01 Arab 
Darnell Washington 407 4.21 Black 
Jermaine Parker 525 5.43 Black 
Leroy Robinson 436 4.51 Black 
Carlos Ruiz 354 3.66 Latino 
Jose Gonzales 291 3.01 Latino 
Juan Rodriguez 259 2.68 Latino 
Bob McCarthy 393 4.06 White 
Johnny O'Brien 480 4.96 White 
Len Baker 366 3.78 White 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1b: Female names used in audit 
  
  Number of Emails 
Percenta
ge of 
emails Race 
    Farah Abbas 419 4.33 Arab 
Fatima Toosi 429 4.44 Arab 
Sefa Ardakani 394 4.07 Arab 
Aaliyah Washington 516 5.33 Black 
Destiny Johnson 464 4.80 Black 
Latoya Parker 497 5.14 Black 
Alejandra Rodriguez 262 2.71 Latina 
Jasmin Ruiz 319 3.30 Latina 
Luz Gonzales 352 3.64 Latina 
Amy Baker 481 4.97 White 
Katherine McCarthy 379 3.92 White 
Sarah O'Brien 396 4.09 White 
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Table 2: Sample Audit Emails and Signals 
Base High-SES Email 
Dear sir/madam, 
[Body Signal 1] I am interested in the rental unit posted on Craigslist, is it still available? I have good 
references, don’t drink or smoke [Body Signal 2], and am happy to send a copy of a recent credit report.  
Regards, 
[First name] [Last name] 
[Signal Quotation]  
 
Body Signal 1 
Single Parent [My kids and I] 
Gay / Lesbian [My partner and I] 
Body Signal 2 
Christian [due to my Christian beliefs] 
Muslim [due to my Islamic beliefs] 
 
Base Low-SES Status 
Hi! Saw your post online. [Body Signal 1] I’m looking for a place, is it still avialable? I stay away from 
partyin [Body Signal 2] and can give you references is you want. Need anything else? peace, 
[First name] [Last name] 
 [Signal Quotation]  
 
Body Signal 1 
Single Parent [My kids and I] 
Gay / Lesbian [My partner and I] 
Body Signal 2 
Christian [because I’m Christian] 
Muslim [because I’m Muslim] 
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Table 3: Signal Types by Protected Class 
  Quotation 
Male (non-Gay) 
 White “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”  
Black "The time is always right to do what is right." - Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Latino “I'm proud to be both Latino and American.” mi abuelo 
Arab “I'm proud to be an Arab-American.” My grandfather 
 
 Female (non-Gay) 
 White “A girl should be two things: classy and fabulous.” – Coco Chanel 
Black “I'm black, I don't feel burdened by it and I don't think it's a huge responsibility. It's 
part of who I am. It does not define me.”  – Oprah Winfrey 
Latino “I'm bicultural, and everyone sees me as a Latina, but in my head I see myself as both 
Latina and American.” – Genesis Rodriguez 
Arab "If a beautiful woman is a jewel, then a good woman is a treasure." –  Mahmood 
Abbas Al-A'aqad 
  Protected Class 
 Single Parent “I didn’t set out to be a single-parent. I set out to be the best parent I can be… and 
that hasn’t changed.”  unknown single parent 
Gay Male "I'm homosexual. How and why are idle questions. It's a little like wanting to know 
why my eyes are green." - Jean Genet  
Lesbian "I'm living by example by continuing on with my career and having a full, rich life, 
and I am incidentally gay."--Portia DeRossi   
Christian “Do to others as you would have them do to you” - Luke 6:31 
Muslim “Wish for your brother, what you wish for yourself.” - the Prophet Muhammad (eng. 
translation) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Number of Signals by Protected Class 
 Name Body Quotation 
Race X  X 
Gender X  X 
Single Parent  X X 
Religion  X X 
Gay  X X 
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Table 5: Sample Unit Characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Bedrooms 8,650 2.123006 1.046227 1 8 
Baths 8,250 1.542909 0.696162 1 6 
apartment 9,673 0.64313 0.479101 0 1 
house 9,673 0.19632 0.397234 0 1 
duplex 9,673 0.021296 0.144378 0 1 
condo 9,673 0.075158 0.263659 0 1 
sqft 6,231 1169.925 671.102 1 9000 
Price 9,547 1805.697 1103.325 100 10000 
            
 
 
Table 6: Number of Audits and Response Rate Across Cities 
  
Number of 
Audits Response Rate (%) 
Full Sample 9,672 36.1% 
Atlanta 456 35.1% 
Boston 703 36.6% 
Chicago 323 41.8% 
Dallas 284 32.0% 
Denver 395 43.3% 
Detroit 527 33.8% 
Houston 394 32.5% 
Los Angeles 566 30.4% 
Miami 292 36.0% 
Minneapolis 577 30.7% 
New York 474 32.5% 
Philadelphia 560 37.7% 
Phoenix 395 26.1% 
Riverside 387 34.1% 
San Diego 663 37.6% 
San Francisco 552 42.0% 
Seattle 624 41.7% 
St. Louis 506 38.7% 
Tampa 368 32.1% 
Washington D.C. 626 42.0% 
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Table 7: Number of Audits and Landlord Response Rates across Race and Protected Class 
  Full Sample White Black Latino Arab 
  
Total  (%) Total  (%) Total  (%) Total  (%) Total (%) 
Male (non-Gay) 1729 35.9% 427 37.9% 450 33.8% 429 44.8% 423 27.2% 
Female (non-
Gay) 1733 38.4% 435 41.1% 420 32.3% 443 40.4% 435 39.8% 
Single Parent 2838 33.1% 646 34.7% 882 29.5% 651 36.3% 659 32.0% 
Gay Male 651 44.5% 153 55.6% 187 41.2% 152 42.1% 159 40.3% 
Lesbian 686 39.5% 176 38.1% 188 36.2% 162 43.8% 160 40.6% 
Christian 932 36.2% 311 41.8% 294 35.0%   327 31.8% 
Muslim 1104 34.0% 347 36.3% 424 30.2%   333 36.3% 
Total 9673 36.1% 2194 38.1% 3087 31.6% 1607 39.5% 2221 33.1% 
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Table 8:  Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Base Model Base + City Full Model 
Black -0.0620*** -0.0608*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0152) 
    
Latino 0.0130 0.0154 0.0334** 
 (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0133) 
    
Arab -0.0469*** -0.0455*** -0.0352* 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0176) 
    
Female (non-Gay) 0.0190** 0.0196** 0.0296*** 
 (0.00881) (0.00875) (0.00919) 
    
Single Parent -0.0423** -0.0414* -0.0496** 
 (0.0201) (0.0199) (0.0212) 
    
Gay 0.0619*** 0.0647*** 0.0824*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0225) 
    
Lesbian 0.0112 0.0105 0.0462 
 (0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0298) 
    
Christian -0.0200 -0.0173 -0.00793 
 (0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0315) 
    
Muslim -0.0379* -0.0368* -0.0503* 
 (0.0189) (0.0191) (0.0244) 
    
High Class Email 0.0420*** 0.0422*** 0.0515*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0155) 
    
Non-Craigslist Email 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0258) (0.0240) 
    
Constant 0.353*** 0.331*** 0.411*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0134) (0.0369) 
    
City Dummies  X X 
Unit Controls   X 
    
Observations 9672 9672 5777 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 9: Regression Results (by race and ethnicity) 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
 Base White Black Latino Arab 
Female  0.0190** 0.0124 -0.0169 -0.0537** 0.110*** 
 (0.00881) (0.0188) (0.0127) (0.0231) (0.0132) 
      
Single Parent -0.0423** -0.0466 -0.0273 -0.0719*** -0.0122 
 (0.0201) (0.0270) (0.0226) (0.0249) (0.0352) 
      
Gay 0.0619*** 0.146*** 0.0743 -0.0634 0.0922** 
 (0.0190) (0.0359) (0.0453) (0.0434) (0.0364) 
      
Lesbian 0.0112 -0.0318 0.0189 -0.0495 0.0937* 
 (0.0221) (0.0507) (0.0386) (0.0479) (0.0494) 
      
Christian -0.0200 0.00152 0.00932  -0.0336 
 (0.0199) (0.0265) (0.0361)  (0.0283) 
      
Muslim -0.0379* -0.0606 -0.0335  0.00681 
 (0.0189) (0.0363) (0.0240)  (0.0390) 
      
Formal Email 0.0420*** 0.0526** 0.0192 0.0573** 0.0445* 
 (0.0118) (0.0218) (0.0248) (0.0251) (0.0247) 
      
Non-CL Email 0.111*** 0.0739** 0.181*** 0.0680** 0.102** 
 (0.0259) (0.0334) (0.0301) (0.0315) (0.0394) 
      
City Dummies X X X X X 
      
Observations 9672 2495 2845 1837 2495 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 10: Interaction Results of Race and Male Sexuality 
 Base + City Base + City  
Race X Gay 
Full  
Race X Gay 
Constant (White male) 0.3315*** 0.3231*** 0.3994*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0132) (0.0375) 
    
Black -0.0608*** -0.0556*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0132) (0.0126) 
    
Latino 0.0154 0.0272* 0.0469*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0142) 
    
Arab -0.0455*** -0.0381*** -0.0240 
 (0.0113) (0.0119) (0.0178) 
    
Gay 0.0647*** 0.156*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0318) (0.0455) 
    
Black X Gay  -0.0840 -0.123* 
  (0.0500) (0.0633) 
    
Latino X Gay  -0.162*** -0.182** 
  (0.0490) (0.0674) 
    
Arab X Gay  -0.121** -0.175** 
  (0.0529) (0.0660) 
    
City Dummies X X X 
Unit Controls   X 
    
Observations 9672 9672 5777 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Table 11: Effect of Being a Gay Couple on Landlord Response Rate 
 Single Male Gay Couple Difference 
White 32.3% 47.9% 15.6% 
    
Black 26.7% 33.9% 7.2% 
    
Latino 35.0% 34.4% -0.6% 
    
Arab 28.5% 32.0% 3.5% 
    
Observations 9672 9672 9672 
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Table 12: Interaction Results of Race and Gender 
 Base + City Base + City  
Race X Female 
Full  
Race X Female 
Female 0.0196** 0.00794 0.0110 
 (0.00875) (0.0186) (0.0208) 
    
Black -0.0608*** -0.0520*** -0.0441** 
 (0.0143) (0.0177) (0.0205) 
     
Latino 0.0154 0.0304 0.0453* 
 (0.0129) (0.0192) (0.0221) 
    
Arab -0.0455*** -0.0854*** -0.0778*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0136) (0.0177) 
    
Black X Female  -0.0188 -0.00587 
  (0.0222) (0.0287) 
      
Latino X Female  -0.0377 -0.0303 
  (0.0280) (0.0444) 
    
Arab X Female  0.0921*** 0.101*** 
  (0.0198) (0.0230) 
    
City Dummies X X X 
Unit Controls   X 
    
Observations 9672 9672 5777 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
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Chapter 2 
 
Can Landlords Change?  
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment Targeting Discriminatory Behavior in Rental 
Housing 
Introduction 
Fair housing laws have been on the books for more than 50 years, yet housing discrimination 
continues to exist. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and local 
fair housing groups receive thousands of complaints each year accusing landlords of unfair 
practices towards applicants and tenants on the basis of race, gender, religion, familial status, 
sexuality, and more. HUD and HUD-funded fair housing groups completed more than 8,000 
investigations of discrimination in both fiscal years 2014 and 2015, and nearly $250 million in 
monetary relief resulted from these cases. Findings from dozens of academic studies offer 
additional evidence of landlords, rental agents, and realtors systematically practicing 
discrimination towards groups protected by fair housing laws. 
Despite a large body of evidence demonstrating discrimination exists, systematic attempts to 
reduce or eliminate discriminatory behavior are generally limited to enforcement and tenant 
education. The primary mechanism, enforcement, threatens landlord profitability, much as jail 
time serves as a deterrent to criminal behavior. Another strategy – educating the public at large – 
aims to support the enforcement mechanism by informing tenants of their rights and how to file 
complaints. While important and well-intended, each approach depends on individual tenants 
filing claims against discriminating landlords in order to be effective. This places tenants in a 
difficult situation, namely, reporting on the landlords from whom they seek housing. Offering 
evidence about the limits of these approaches in overcoming housing discrimination are findings 
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that roughly 80% of tenants who believe to have experienced housing discrimination remain 
silent (Abravanel, 2006). 
This project proposes a complementary strategy to tenant-based mechanisms that directly targets 
rental agents and landlords. By focusing policy interventions at the group with the power to 
discriminate, this approach reduces the dependency on victim reports to mitigate discrimination. 
The project details an experiment designed to influence landlord behavior. The purpose is to test 
whether landlords and rental agents will change their behavior in response to being presented 
with information about their obligations under fair housing law. The primary hypothesis is that 
the “treatment” email will increase landlord response rates.   
There are at least three reasons why informing landlords of the law may increase response rates. 
First, some landlords may tune out to public service announcements targeting tenants. While 
landlords may hear about the law as members of the population at large, the messages are 
communicated to renters. To the extent that many landlords are indeed home owners; they may 
simply ignore messages targeted at a population they do not identify with. Thus, directly 
targeting landlords may improve their awareness. 
A second reason is that the Internet has created a new generation of landlords who may not 
understand or be aware of their obligations under the law. Websites like Craigslist.com allow 
property owners to advertise rental units with no paper work, on their own time, and at no cost. 
Not only does this make it easier to rent property, but it saves landlords the significant 
commission paid to realtors to find tenant(s), which is commonly one to one-and-a-half month’s 
rent. These new landlords differ from traditional rental agents in important ways. Notably, many 
are part-time realtors/landlords who lack a real estate license. Unlike licensed realtors, these 
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landlords are not trained or tested about fair housing law and may be unfamiliar with their 
obligations. Presenting them with the information, then, may improve their behavior. 
The above reasons assume a treatment effect will be driven by a lack of knowledge, though some 
discriminating landlords may change their behavior due to fears about being caught. The overall 
risk of being caught discriminating against tenants is relatively low. Evidence discussed earlier 
suggests some tenants may be afraid and most do not file complaints when they feel 
discriminated against. With online platform such as Craigslist providing anonymity to 
advertisers, discriminating landlords may be using this to their advantage. While the 
consequences of being caught are certainly a threat to profitability, some landlords may feel the 
benefits to discriminating outweigh the risks. It is possible that informing these landlords about 
the law will suggest that someone is monitoring their posts, regardless of anonymity. If the 
presence of a monitor causes some landlords to perceive a higher risk associated with 
discriminatory actions, these landlords may alter their behavior and act more equitably towards 
potential tenants.  
The hypothesis that the treatment will have a positive effect on landlord response rates is 
consistent across all three scenarios. Identifying which of the above causes may influence 
landlords is important, however, as it can inform policy about whether it is due to a lack of 
information about the law or new technologies are creating opportunities for landlords to 
circumvent. This is not the primary focus of this paper, though potential opportunities to test at 
least one of these causes are discussed in Section 4.    
The contribution of this paper, then, is to demonstrate a unique opportunity to test policy 
interventions aimed at reducing discrimination in a real housing market and at a very low cost. It 
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is hoped that the method can be modified and expanded by fair housing agencies, advocates, and 
other institutions to test and implement policy interventions designed to decrease discrimination.  
The proof of concept provided by this paper is a randomized experiment that informs landlords 
of their legal obligations and tests whether this knowledge influences their behavior. The 
experiment creates a treatment group of randomly assigned online rental housing posts to send an 
informational email about fair housing law. After disbursing treatment emails, a correspondence 
audit is conducted as a means for testing whether the informational email influences landlord 
behavior. The audit method measures whether landlords receiving fair housing information 
respond differently to inquiry emails than do those landlords who did not receive the 
information. A differential response rate between the two groups of landlords is interpreted as a 
treatment effect.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I begins with a discussion of fair housing laws and 
efforts to reduce discrimination. Specific attention is given to the primary mechanisms that have 
been used to combat housing discrimination, notably enforcement and education. The objective 
of this discussion is to provide the motivation for directly targeting policy interventions at 
landlords. Section II describes the experiment while Section III details the correspondence audit 
methodology used for measuring the treatment effect. Section IV presents the results of the 
initial experiment, which are intended to serve as a proof of concept for the potential of the 
method. Section V concludes the paper with a discussion of the project and possible extensions.  
The Case for Targeting Landlords 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 represents the tipping point after which the federal government 
became actively involved in fair housing. The act made equal treatment in housing a federal law, 
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preventing discriminatory practices on the basis of race, color, nationality of origin, and gender. 
In 1988 the act was expanded to cover disabled persons and families with children. Importantly, 
the act and its amendments go beyond protection and provide funds for state, local, and non-
profit organizations to assist with educating the public and assist with enforcing these laws.  
The most recent Annual Report on Fair Housing released by HUD is for the fiscal years 2014-
2015.13 In aggregate, HUD and its state and local partners closed more than 16,000 fair housing 
cases. There are 88 housing agencies in 35 states receiving fair housing funding from HUD, 
representing more than 80% of the cases filed and closed during the 2-year period. Figure 1 
presents these cases on the basis of the complaint, revealing people with disabilities (42%) 
represent the largest group of filers. Race (21%) and Nation of Origin (9%) make up nearly a 
third of complaints, and Families with Children (9%) and Gender (8%) also represent sizable 
groups filing complaints. 
Beyond enforcement, HUD awarded the National Fair Housing Alliance with $2.4 million in 
funding for a nation-wide media campaign targeting tenant education. The theme, “Fair Housing 
Is Your Right. Use It,” reached millions of Americans through public services announcement on 
the Internet, radio, and television. The campaign focused on informing tenants of their rights and 
included a “How to File a Complaint” video. While these educational efforts are certainly 
important, filing a complaint against a landlord may be risky, as 8% of complaints filed in 2015 
refer to retaliation against tenants by offending landlords. 
HUD’s role in fair housing extends well beyond the above media campaigns and enforcement to 
include a role as the primary institution designing and implementing policy. In this capacity, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Source: https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=FY14-15AnnualReport.pdf 
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HUD has and does fund research efforts to measure public perceptions, discriminatory practices, 
and the effectiveness of policy interventions. Two efforts are relevant to this paper. 
The first, the Housing Discrimination Study (HDS), provides the largest and most 
comprehensive measure of discrimination at a national level. Conducted every 8-12 years since 
1977, the study is designed to provide a snapshot of current levels of housing discrimination and, 
importantly, allow for comparisons with previous studies. The in-person, paired audit method 
employed (discussed further in Section II), represents the most influential test of discrimination 
practices and has been upheld by the courts and successfully used by enforcement agencies in 
countless legal cases.14 The most recent 2012 HDS reveals measures of discrimination have 
fallen over time, though they are far from being eliminated. The findings of the HDS studies 
serve as invaluable tools for practitioners, researchers, and policymakers and have been 
influential in shaping federal, state, and local fair housing policy for decades.  
A second notable HUD initiative with relevance to this project is two HUD-sponsored surveys 
examining public knowledge of fair housing laws. Conducted in 2000/1 and 2005 (Abravanel, 
2006) (Abravanel, 2002), the studies were designed to provide a nationally representative 
estimate of public knowledge about the law. Participants were provided with a series of ten 
hypothetical scenarios taken by various housing providers and asked whether the actions taken 
were in violation of the law. The surveys were designed to be comparable, with the objective of 
measuring changes in public awareness resulting from a national fair housing educational 
campaign conducted by the Ad Council beginning in August of 2003. The results are 
informative. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See the HUD website or Oh and Yinger 2015 for examples. 
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Roughly 50% of participants correctly identified the legality of a behavior in at least six of the 
ten scenarios. Public knowledge did not appear to change in any notable way over the period, 
however, despite the large-scale education campaign. Seventeen percent of the participants 
believed they had been discriminated against, the majority of whom indicated it to have occurred 
more than once. Despite this, fewer than 20% who believed to have been treated unfairly 
acknowledged contacting a local agency or filing a complaint. 
The enforcement and educational role of HUD, the national housing discrimination studies, and 
the public awareness surveys provide the theoretical foundation for this experiment. As 
demonstrated by the annual report and HDS, housing discrimination persists and continues to 
limit the housing options of thousands of households each year. The primary mechanisms for 
attacking this discrimination – education and enforcement – play important roles in reducing 
discrimination, but their dependency on tenant reporting may limit their effectiveness. Roughly 
one in ten complaints filed are on the basis of retaliation, and as much as 80% of perceived 
victims acknowledge remaining silent.  
The evidence suggests complementary strategies that reduce dependency on tenant reporting 
may be useful. Thus, the remainder of this paper presents one such strategy, focusing on 
landlords. The utility of the design is that the low-cost strategy uses methods that are familiar to 
all fair housing advocates, and offers an opportunity to directly inform policy and test potential 
interventions.   
Experimental Design 
The experimental design of this project is composed of two distinct methods, a policy 
intervention and a correspondence audit study. The policy intervention, or treatment, is designed 
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to provide a random sample of rental housing agents with information about fair housing law. 
Following this treatment, a randomized correspondence housing audit is conducted to measure 
whether landlords receiving the fair housing information have different response rates to 
potential applicants than do those who do not receive the information. The complete 
randomization of each phase of the project allows for interpreting a differential response rate 
between the groups as the treatment effect of the fair housing information.  
 
Policy Intervention 
The policy intervention is an email that emphasizes several aspects of fair housing law. The 
primary goal is to communicate information, so it details what the law says about the obligations 
required of agents and landlords in the sale and rental of housing. While online buy/sell 
platforms such as Craigslist.com do inform advertisers they must abide by the law, Figure 2 
demonstrates the emphasis is on the advertising of the unit, not the tenant selection process.15 
The treatment email therefore makes it clear that the law applies throughout the entire sales 
process. The email also provides links to websites offering additional information and resources, 
such as HUD.  
In order for the treatment to be effective, the treated landlords must find it believable and 
differentiate it from SPAM. In order to accomplish this, the website 
www.FairHousingAwareness.org and the online profile for Eric M. were created. As the 
motivation for this study is to attempt to influence landlord behavior, concern existed that 
landlords might simply disregard an unsolicited email from an unknown source. The primary 
purpose of the website, then is to provide validation for the treatment email. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 https://www.craigslist.org/about/FHA 
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The website was designed from the perspective of a private citizen and online landlord who 
cared about fair housing due to personal experience. The website therefore has several pages, 
informing visitors about its mission, the personal experience of online landlord Eric M., and 
provides links to resources about fair housing (Figure 4, Figure 8-11 ). The decision to name the 
website was then determined by the informative nature of Eric M’s mission and what domain 
names were available.  
The website serves an additional purpose. Practically, the website creates a profile and domain 
name from which treatment emails can be sent (Eric@fairhousingawareness.org). While email 
domains can be achieved in various ways, developing the website was determined to be the most 
practical way to create an effective and believable treatment that provided inquisitive landlords 
with access to additional information.  
Once the treatment email was designed, the next step was to determine how to disburse 
treatment. After considering a wide range of options, the decision was made to purchase an email 
marketing program from www.MailerMailer.com. The advantages of MailerMailer were 
significant. First, it offers a user-friendly interface for designing professional-looking emails that 
can be customized to individual email addresses. This feature allowed for treatment emails to be 
sent in bulk, saving considerable time and resources.  
A second benefit, however, proved to be even more valuable. In the process of selecting a 
marketing program, several dozen firms were considered because they offered the ability to track 
whether emails were read and if the links included were clicked on. Only MailerMailer, 
however, allowed for downloading the open and click rates at the individualized landlord level. 
Other products allowed for aggregate charts, but what was needed for the purpose of this study 
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was the ability to identify which individual landlords opened the treatment emails they received. 
This key distinction of MailerMailer set it apart.  
Leveraging Audits to Identify a Treatment Effect 
This experiment employs a housing audit in order to test the effect of a policy intervention aimed 
at reducing discrimination. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first time the audit 
method has been used in this capacity.  
Audits refer to a type of experiment used in testing for discriminatory behavior in live markets 
where decisions are made without participant awareness of the audit being conducted. The 
purpose is to identify discriminatory behavior as it exists in practice. In contrast with many 
experiments, audits examine the behavior of individuals without informing participants that they 
are taking place in a study. This is done to mitigate the risk that the knowledge of the audit 
influences behavior. Thus, the unique opportunity presented by this experimental design is to 
leverage the audit framework as a means for testing the impact of policy interventions in a 
normally functioning market. 
Types of Housing Audits 
Housing audits began as in-person experiments in which trained actors inquire about and apply 
for a housing unit advertised in a local newspaper. The actors are then paired according to traits 
likely to influence landlord decisions, such as age, income, education, job, appearance and more. 
To clearly identify that the differences in treatment are driven by the attribute being tested (i.e. 
Race, Gender, etc.), great care is taken to ensure the applicants qualifications for renting the unit 
are as similar as possible. Actors record multiple aspects of the encounter, such as the time the 
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agent spends with the applicant, the availability of the advertised unit, and more. Discrimination 
is then identified as differential treatment between the two groups.16  
Changes in the way households find housing has created a new opportunity for conducting 
audits. Online housing websites, such as www.Craigslist.com, provide a platform through which 
landlords and rental agents can advertise housing to anyone with an Internet connection. 
Interested applicants can submit inquiries via email, often requesting additional information and 
providing some personal details to the posting agent. These online marketplaces thereby create 
an extraordinary opportunity for fair housing advocates and researchers to test for discrimination. 
Posing as interested applicants, email inquiries are submitted for advertised housing units posted 
online. Using names and other signals that are commonly associated with particular ethnic or 
demographic characteristics, testers compare landlord response rates to identify differential 
treatment. The most common examples test racially or ethnically associated names, such as 
Johnny O’Brien or Darnell Robinson, and compare landlord response rates to each (Carpusor & 
Loges, 2006) (Ahmed & Hammarstedt, 2008) (Hanson & Hawley, 2011) (Hanson & Santas, 
2014). As the method has evolved, other variations have been used to test differential treatment 
by gender (Ewens, Tomlin, & Wang, 2014) (Andersson, Jakobsson, & Kotsadam, 2012), 
sexuality (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt, 2008), (Friedman, 2013), (Schwegman, 2017), 
class (Hanson & Hawley, 2011) (Andersson, Jakobsson, & Kotsadam, 2012) (Bosch, Carnero, & 
Farre, 2010), employment (Ahmed, Andersson, & Hammarstedt, 2010), behavior ( (Ahmed, 
Andersson, & Hammarstedt, 2010) (Ewens, Tomlin, & Wang, 2014)), among others. See Oh and 
Yinger 2015 for a detailed review of the literature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Yinger, 1986 for detailed discussion. 
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Correspondence audits provide narrower measure of discrimination, however, examining only 
landlord responses to inquiry emails. Much of the nuance acquired during in-person audits is 
lost, and causal mechanisms are more difficult to identify. An important benefit, however, is that 
correspondence audits can avoid the risk of actor-influences on results, as the only information 
communicated to landlords are text-based signals. Thus, while more narrow in scope, cleaner 
identification is possible. This clean identification, combined with scarce resources available to 
scholars, practitioners, and advocates of fair housing, gives the correspondence audit design 
considerable advantage for the proposed experiment. 
A decision must be made about whether to employ a matched-pair or randomized audit 
framework. The key distinction between the two methods is that landlords in a matched-pair 
audit receive two or more inquiries from multiple applicants, while landlords in a fully 
randomized audit receive only a single email. Differential treatment in a matched-pair audit 
measures the response rate within each landlord, while treatment in a randomized audit is 
measured across the landlords in the sample. Though both methods can be employed in this 
experimental design, selection has important trade-offs. 
A fully randomized audit design was selected as the preferred framework for measuring this 
treatment effect. The primary driver of this decision was for identification purposes. A key 
concern in matched-pair audits is that of detection. If landlords become suspicious an audit is 
occurring, they are likely to alter their behavior and compromise the validity of the results. 
Testers thus go to great lengths in matched designs to minimize the risk of detection, but there 
are important trade-offs at each step that can compromise the audit. As this is the first time the 
audit method has been used to measure a treatment effect, a randomized design was selected in 
order to all but eliminate detection risk. 
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A secondary benefit of the randomized design is practical. The randomized audit allows for a 
simple treatment and a control group set-up. All landlords are selected at random and a random 
sample of these is primed with the treatment email. Following treatment, email inquiries are sent 
to the full sample, and response rates between the treated landlords can be easily compared with 
the untreated landlords. The benefit of the randomized design is that timing concerns about the 
order of sending the inquires are eliminated and the syntax of each email is identical across the 
treatment and control groups. Though the randomized audit design requires a larger sample of 
landlords, it is believed that the ease of implementation ultimately saved time.17 
Designing Signals 
Central to an effective correspondence audit design is communicating group status through 
signals included in each email inquiry. As this experiment is designed to assess the impact of a 
policy intervention on landlord treatment of groups protected under fair housing law, multiple 
signals were employed. Signals identifying race, gender, family status, sexuality and religion 
were used. The details of how the signals were communicated are as follows.  
The randomized design allows a nearly identical syntax be used for all emails, the base form of 
which is included below. Each email inquires about the unit’s availability and volunteers some 
positive information about each applicant. A second version of the email is written to provide a 
level of class variation, including several grammatical errors and less formal language.   
Dear sir/madam, 
[Body Signal 1] I am interested in the rental unit posted on Craigslist, is it still available? I have 
good references, don’t drink or smoke [Body Signal 2], and am happy to send a copy of a recent 
credit report.  
Regards, 
[First name] [Last name] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 An exciting opportunity exists to employ a matched-pair audit framework to exploit a pre and post treatment effect. See Section V.  
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[Signal Quotation]  
 
Following previous studies, race, ethnicity and gender were signaled using names commonly 
associated with a particular ethnicity or gender. A notable deviation from other correspondence 
studies in the U.S. is that multiple races and ethnicities are included for which limited name data 
exists for the U.S. Thus, first names selected for all races come from websites listing common 
names for each groups. Surnames used for whites and blacks came from Bertrand and 
Mullinathian (2004), while Latinos and Middle-Eastern names were constructed in similar 
fashion to the first names. (Table 23) To mitigate potential concerns about what is inferred from 
names constructed in this manner, a second and more direct signal is also used in the signature 
line of each email to communicate group membership. 
Signaling non-race based protected group membership is not possible using names. Thus, signals 
must be communicated in a manner that might reasonably be included in an introductory email 
inquiry for housing. To accomplish this, membership was signaled in the body of each email, by 
slightly modifying the base email to suggest group membership. (Figure 5) Signaling sexuality, 
for example, “My partner and I” is inserted to [Body Signal 1] to introduce who is inquiring 
about the unit. Signaling religion is done in [Body Signal 2], by adding the phrase “due to my 
Islamic(Christian) beliefs” as the motivation for not drinking and smoking.  
To ensure at least two signals for group membership are included for each group, an additional 
signal is provided in the signature line of each email inquiry. Continuing with the religion 
example, Christian and Islamic variations of the “Golden Rule” were included.18 Quotations 
signaling race, gender, sexuality and family status are also used (Table 13). This additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Iterations of each email are included in the appendix 
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signal is used to increase the probability that the landlord identifies the email inquiry as being 
sent from someone in a particular group. Table 14 summarizes the signal types used by protected 
class. 
Sample Collection  
The objective of correspondence audit in this experiment is to assess the treatment effect across a 
spectrum of protected classes covered by U.S. Fair Housing Law. To estimate the effect, the 
research employs a randomized design using housing units posted on Craigslist in the 20 most 
populated U.S. cities. 
Craigslist is an ideal venue to conduct a correspondence audit for several reasons. It offers a 
local webpage in nearly every U.S. city, receives a high volume of traffic, is free to use for both 
landlords and renters, and employs an identical format across all U.S. apartment rental sites. 
More than 50 billion page views occur globally each year, and 60 million people use Craigslist 
each month in the U.S. alone.19 Of particular attractiveness to audit studies is that the format for 
housing posts is identical across all U.S. sites, allowing unit-specific data to be gathered in a 
consistent manner across all cities.  
Units were randomly selected on each day of the week and inquiry emails were submitted within 
24 hours of being posted on Craigslist. Posts were collected from each city in batches of 100 
using a semi-automated process.20 Extensive effort was made to avoid sending inquiries to 
landlords posting multiple units. The de-duplicating process began by eliminating units sharing 
the same Craigslist ID, address, phone number, realty company, or housing development. Next, 
individual unit advertisements were scanned for similar characteristics that suggested a shared 
landlord. Landlords commonly use the same format for multiple posts, similar marketing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Craigslist.com 
20 The collection process employed a program written by Phil Murchie. The program provides a semi-automated process for gathering unit 
information and contacting landlords. Without this tool, the data gathering process would have been significantly more cumbersome.   
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phrases, company logos, and other practices. Any unit raising even the slightest doubt was 
eliminated. Finally, posts were compared with a master-file of all previously de-duplicated posts 
and a second round of de-duplication was conducted. In total, roughly 60% of posts were deleted 
using this process. 
Each post received a single email indicating interest in the unit, from one of 24 names varying by 
race and gender and of the form first.last####@gmail.com. Each inquiry was then randomly 
assigned group membership for one of 8 additional profiles. The first emails were sent July 25th, 
2016 and responses were recorded until September 19th, 2016, which was two weeks after the 
final inquiries were sent. 
The original experimental design called for a large enough sample size to allow for the potential 
to conduct subgroup analyses within race and protected group. The intent was to examine 
whether some groups experienced higher response rates as a result of the treatment in 
comparison to others. Such analysis might prove informative about the mechanisms through 
which the treatment operated. If larger treatment effects are found among protected groups 
relative to race or ethnicity alone, for example, it might suggest online-landlord have a lower 
awareness of non-race-based protections. 
Unfortunately, a structural flaw occurred in the disbursement of the treatment emails that limited 
treatment to a particular subset of Craigslist landlords. Craigslist advertisers have the option to 
use identifiable contact information or choose anonymity through a randomized, Craigslist-
generated temporary email address. This provides privacy to sellers until they opt to reveal their 
identity to potential buyers. This also creates two distinct groups of sellers, those who provide 
identifiable information and those who do not. Based on the random sample collected for this 
project, roughly nine of 10 housing advertisers opt for anonymity.  
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This distinction had important consequences for the disbursement of treatment emails. A feature 
in the design of the treatment email is believed to have triggered a flag in the Craigslist email-
relay servers, which prevented the treatment email from reaching landlords opting for 
anonymous email addresses. Treatment emails sent to landlords who provided identifiable 
contact information were received, however, as evidenced by the MailerMailer reports. As the 
daily send reports provided only aggregate snapshots of open rates, the glitch went unnoticed 
until analysis began.  
Sample Characteristics 
The results of the structural problem limited the treatment to the subset of landlords who opted to 
provide identifiable information. In order to create a suitable control group, then, only landlords 
providing their contact information are included in the analysis. The randomness of the sample 
and distribution of treatment remain; however, the sample size reduced to roughly 10% of the 
originally collected sample. Ultimately, a total of 1,112 landlords are included, of which 515 
received the treatment email.  
Table 15 presents the number of observations for the treatment and control groups, aggregated 
by protected category. Aggregating in this way results in non-exclusive categories, as protected 
class is assigned across race and ethnicity. Non-white applicants represent roughly three-quarters 
of both the treatment and control groups. Emails signaling protected group membership account 
for 93% of the sample, as all inquiries in the experiment sent from applicants other than white 
males are protected under fair housing law. 
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Empirical Results 
Figure 6 presents the mean response rate for the aggregate protected groups. These simple 
averages show the response rate for inquiries from the treatment group to be 3.8% - 4.6% higher 
than that of the control group. Figure 7 presents the response rates for the subgroups and reveals 
a similar pattern. With the exception of Latinos, who received equal responses in both groups, 
responses from landlords were 2% - 9% higher in the Treatment group than in the Control group.  
The statistical significance of these differences in means was assessed using paired sample t-tests 
and is presented in Table 16 T-Tests for Differences in Mean Response Rates:. Despite the 
consistency in which the Treatment group received higher response rates, the t-tests reveal these 
differences in means are not statistically significant by conventional measures, either in 
aggregate or at a subgroup level. Given the effect sizes, a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 
software21 was conducted and indicates a sample of the originally intended size is necessary to 
achieve significance. 
The objective of this experiment is to understand how the effect of receiving an email about fair 
housing law influences landlord response rates to housing inquiries. By utilizing the “Click” data 
from MailerMailer to identify which landlords opened the treatment email, an opportunity for 
further analysis exists. Table 17: Landlords Who Received Treatment is descriptive and shows 
50% of the landlords who received the email actually opened it, and those who opened the email 
were 23% more likely to respond than those who did not open or receive a treatment email. 
Table 18: IV Regression Results (full sample) incorporates these data into a regression 
framework. Comparing landlord responses to those who opened the email with those who did not 
will overstate the treatment effect, because opening an email is certainly correlated with one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Can be downloaded free. 
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likelihood of responding. Further, as those receiving the treatment email can choose whether to 
comply (open the email) or decline (ignore the email), the compliers no longer represent a 
randomly assigned treatment group. Therefore, the large positive and significant effects in 
Columns 1 and 2 are biased.  
Columns 3 and 4 compare differences in landlord response rates to those who were randomly 
assigned treatment with those who were not. Due to random assignment, these intent-to-treat 
(ITT) estimates can be interpreted causally, suggesting landlords who were sent a treatment 
email were about 4% more likely to respond. Though causal, these estimates understate the 
treatment effect on those who received treatment; because 50% declined the treatment they were 
offered.  
Angrist and Pishke (2009) discuss that an instrumental variable (IV) approach using randomly 
assigned treatment can fix this compliance issue. Using those landlords who were offered 
treatment (ITT) as an IV for those receiving treatment provides a causal estimate of the treatment 
effect. The ITT represents an ideal IV because it is correlated with treatment – a landlord must 
receive the treatment email in order to open it – and the random assignment of the treatment 
across the sample of landlords ensures independence. Further, because non-compliance is limited 
to the treatment group, the estimates represent a special case of a local average treatment effect 
(LATE) that is interpreted as the effect of treatment on the treated (TOT).  
Columns 5 and 6 present the results of the IV analysis. The IV models suggest treatment 
increases landlord response rates by roughly 8%, though the results are not significantly different 
than zero by conventional measures. Being that 50% of the landlords declined treatment, an 8% 
treatment on the treated estimate makes sense, as it is equivalent to the ITT effect of 4% divided 
by the 50% compliance rate. Put differently, because of the random design and one-sided 
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compliance, the TOT effect of 8% represents the ITT effect (4%) divided by the compliance rate 
(50%).  
Table 19 restricts the ITT and TOT analysis to the aggregated Non-White and Protected Group 
subsamples. These subgroups are selected because the intent of informing landlords about the 
law is to improve response rates to protected populations. Consistent with the results of the ttests, 
the response rate for the treated group of landlords is higher among the non-White (6.3%) and 
Protected (8.9%) samples. Power analysis again indicates, however, a larger sample is necessary 
for significance at conventional standards. 
Discussion 
The results of the experiment consistently suggest the group of landlords who received 
information about fair housing law responded at a higher rate than did those who did not receive 
the treatment email. Thus, the experiment offers evidence that utilizing the audit framework for 
testing policy interventions is a ripe opportunity for further research by scholars and 
practitioners. Several examples are discussed below.  
A simple extension that is currently underway will achieve a larger sample size and tweaks the 
informational email slightly to test the effects of varying the intervention. The original email 
informs landlords about their obligations, but it is not designed to identify what is motivating the 
effect. Varying treatment from a simple public service announcement to one that emphasizes 
legal actions that can be brought against landlords can offer insight into the extent to which 
landlords are motivated by fear of getting caught.  
From a practitioner standpoint, conducting a similar experiment but sending the emails from a 
fair housing advocacy group or government agency offers a similar opportunity. Similar to the 
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HUD-sponsored Ad-Council campaigns and analysis, such an experiment might focus on 
educating landlords, rental agents, or mortgage lenders about their obligations under the law and 
then utilize the audit method for testing the efficacy of the intervention. Such an analysis might 
involve multiple audits over time, going back to the same landlords, for example, to test for the 
longitudinal effect of the campaign.  
A particularly unique opportunity exists within any platform for which identifiable emails are 
available, such as the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), the subset of Craigslist landlords, or 
mortgage brokers. By exploiting identifiable emails, for example, a pre- and post-design can be 
employed by conducting multiple audits with the policy intervention being conducted in 
between. Such an experiment might build on the work of Hanson, Hawley and Martin (2017 
working paper) to estimate peer-effects, for example, and design an intervention to inform 
mortgage brokers about the behavior of their financial institution when receiving inquiries from 
minority applicants.  
Such interventions do not need to be limited to correspondence audits or even housing. HUD 
might, for example, apply such a design to test hypotheses about a variety of issues into the in-
person discrimination studies. By providing tested rental agents or landlords with specific 
information about steering prior to the audit, for example, landlord behavior can be examined 
beyond the initial inquiry process correspondence audits are generally limited to. Beyond 
housing, opportunities may exist in labor or other fields, though achieving a sufficient sample 
may be limiting due to differences in buy-sell websites like Craigslist and job boards. 
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Conclusion 
Ultimately, the intent of this project is to propose a complementary strategy to existing efforts to 
reduce housing discrimination. Though the sample size limits the significance of the results, the 
author hopes the design inspires other fair housing advocates to develop similar ways to 
creatively influence the behavior of those with the power to discriminate. Decades of audits have 
shown discrimination continues to limit the opportunity of many to find housing and jobs. Many 
efforts have been made to motivate individuals who have been discriminated against to take 
action, though these efforts have not fully overcome the problem. It is the intent of this design, 
then, to provide policymakers, advocates, and researchers with a framework for which to test the 
efficacy of policy interventions on the particular group of individuals who limit the opportunities 
of others.   
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Figure 1: HUD and HUD-Partner Fair Housing Complaints 2014-2015 
 
Source: HUD Office of Fair Housing & Equal Opportunity Annual Report to Congress (2014-2015) 
 
Figure 2: Equal Opportunity in Advertising, not Housing 
 
Source: https://www.craigslist.org/about/FHA  
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Figure 3: Fair Housing Treatment Email 
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Figure 4: Treatment Website (www.FairHousingAwareness.org) 
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Figure 5: Sample Audit Emails and Signals 
Base High-SES Email 
Dear sir/madam, 
[Body Signal 1] I am interested in the rental unit posted on Craigslist, is it still available? I have 
good references, don’t drink or smoke [Body Signal 2], and am happy to send a copy of a recent 
credit report.  
Regards, 
[First name] [Last name] 
[Signal Quotation]  
 
Body Signal 1 
Single Parent [My kids and I] 
Gay / Lesbian [My partner and I] 
Body Signal 2 
Christian [due to my Christian beliefs] 
Muslim [due to my Islamic beliefs] 
Base Low-SES Status 
Hi! Saw your post online. [Body Signal 1] I’m looking for a place, is it still avialable? I stay 
away from partyin [Body Signal 2] and can give you references is you want. Need anything else? 
peace, 
[First name] [Last name] 
 [Signal Quotation]  
 
Body Signal 1 
Single Parent [My kids and I] 
Gay / Lesbian [My partner and I] 
Body Signal 2 
Christian [because I’m Christian] 
Muslim [because I’m Muslim] 
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Table 13: Signal Quotations Used in Audit Inquiry Emails 
  Quotation 
Male (non-Gay) 
 White “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”  
Black "The time is always right to do what is right." - Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Latino “I'm proud to be both Latino and American.” mi abuelo 
Arab “I'm proud to be an Arab-American.” My grandfather 
 
 Female (non-
Gay) 
 White “A girl should be two things: classy and fabulous.” – Coco Chanel 
Black “I'm black, I don't feel burdened by it and I don't think it's a huge 
responsibility. It's part of who I am. It does not define me.”  – Oprah Winfrey 
Latino “I'm bicultural, and everyone sees me as a Latina, but in my head I see myself 
as both Latina and American.” – Genesis Rodriguez 
Arab "If a beautiful woman is a jewel, then a good woman is a treasure." –  
Mahmood Abbas Al-A'aqad 
  Protected Class 
 Single Parent “I didn’t set out to be a single-parent. I set out to be the best parent I can be… 
and that hasn’t changed.”  unknown single parent 
Gay Male "I'm homosexual. How and why are idle questions. It's a little like wanting to 
know why my eyes are green." - Jean Genet  
Lesbian "I'm living by example by continuing on with my career and having a full, rich 
life, and I am incidentally gay."--Portia DeRossi   
Christian “Do to others as you would have them do to you” - Luke 6:31 
Muslim “Wish for your brother, what you wish for yourself.” - the Prophet Muhammad 
(eng. translation) 
 
 
Table 14: Signal Types by Protected Class 
 Name Body Quotation 
Race X  X 
Gender X  X 
Single Parent  X X 
Religion  X X 
Gay  X X 
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Table 15: Treatment and Control Group Landlords 
  Treatment Control 
  (N) Group % (N) Group % 
     Total 515 100.0% 597 100.0% 
     Non-White 381 74.0% 430 72.0% 
Protected Class 477 92.6% 558 93.5% 
          
 
Figure 6: Raw Differences in Mean Response Rates (aggregate groups) 
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Figure 7: Raw Differences in Mean Response Rates (subgroups) 
 
 
Table 16 T-Tests for Differences in Mean Response Rates: 
  Treatment Group Control Group T-Test 
  N Response % N Response % Diff. t= 
       Aggregate 
Groups 
      Full Sample 515 48.3% 597 44.2% 4.1%  1.38  
Non-White 381 48.0% 430 44.7% 3.4%  0.96  
Protected 477 48.6% 558 43.9% 4.7%  1.52  
       Subgroups 
      White 134 49.3% 167 43.1% 6.1%  1.06  
Black 138 52.9% 168 45.2% 7.7%  1.33  
Latino 113 46.9% 117 47.0% -0.1%  0.02  
Arab 130 43.8% 145 42.1% 1.8%  0.30  
Single Parent 165 41.8% 163 38.7% 3.2%  0.58  
Gay or Lesbian 68 58.8% 100 54.0% 4.8%  0.62  
Religious 93 47.3% 129 38.0% 9.3%  1.39  
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Table 17: Landlords Who Received Treatment 
  Control Treatment Total 
Response 
Rate 
   
  
Status unknown 597 258 855 40.8% 
Opened 0 257 257 63.8% 
   
  
Total 597 515 1,112 46.1% 
 
 
Table 18: IV Regression Results (full sample) 
 
Comparison by Opening 
Email (OLS) 
Comparison by 
Assignment Status (ITT) 
Instrumental Variables 
Estimates (TOT) 
 
Base + City Base + City Base + City 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     
  
Treatment 0.2299 0.2011 0.0413 0.0419 0.0827 0.0822 
 
6.60 5.76 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.44 
       
Constant 0.4082 0.2965 0.4422 0.2925 0.4422 0.3072 
 24.39 5.78 21.67 5.39 21.92 5.99 
       
City dummies 
 
X 
 
X  X 
     
  
Observations  1,112   1,112   1,112   1,112  1,112 1,112 
 
 
Table 19: IV Regression Results (non-white and protected class samples) 
  Non-White Sample Protected Sample 
  ITT TOT  ITT TOT  
     Treatment 0.0313 0.0627 0.0454 0.0890 
 
0.90 0.92 1.47 1.50 
    
Constant 0.2931 0.3051 0.2892 0.3057 
 4.70 5.19 5.14 5.76 
     
City dummies X X X X 
     Observations  811   811   1,035   1,035  
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 8: Page 2 of www.FairHousingAwareness.org 
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Figure 9: Page 3 of www.FairHousingAwareness.org 
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Figure 10: Page 4 of  www.FairHousingAwareness.org 
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Figure 11: Page 5 of www.FairHousingAwareness.org 
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Table 20: Inquiries by Race and Ethnicity: 
Race / Ethnicity Treatment Control 
   Arab 130 145 
Black 138 168 
Latina 113 117 
White 134 167 
   Total 515 597 
 
Table 21: Inquiries by Gender 
  Treatment Control 
FEMALES 
  Arab 64 67 
Black 60 98 
Latina 61 50 
White 53 84 
   MALES 
  Arab 66 78 
Black 78 70 
Latino 52 67 
White 81 83 
      
 
Table 22: Inquiries by Protected Class 
  Treatment Control 
Female 207 247 
Single Parent 165 163 
Gay or Lesbian 68 100 
Christian 44 67 
Muslim 49 62 
   Protected Class 533 639 
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Table 23: Inquiries by Name 
Female Names Treatment Control Total Race 
     Farah Abbas 22 20 42 Arab 
Fatima Toosi 20 30 50 Arab 
Sefa Ardakani 22 17 39 Arab 
Aaliyah Washington 18 37 55 Black 
Destiny Johnson 23 22 45 Black 
Latoya Parker 19 39 58 Black 
Alejandra Rodriguez 18 15 33 Latina 
Jasmin Ruiz 20 11 31 Latina 
Luz Gonzales 23 24 47 Latina 
Amy Baker 23 32 55 White 
Katherine McCarthy 13 22 35 White 
Sarah O'Brien 17 30 47 White 
     Total 238 299 537  
     Male Names Treatment Control Total Race 
     Abdul Abbas 20 24 44 Arab 
Mohammed Toosi 26 30 56 Arab 
Saied Ardakani 20 24 44 Arab 
Darnell Washington 25 18 43 Black 
Jermaine Parker 31 26 57 Black 
Leroy Robinson 22 26 48 Black 
Carlos Ruiz 23 24 47 Latino 
Jose Gonzales 19 20 39 Latino 
Juan Rodriguez 10 23 33 Latino 
Bob McCarthy 23 29 52 White 
Johnny O'Brien 35 26 61 White 
Len Baker 23 28 51 White 
     Total 277 298 575  
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Table 24: Treatment and Control Group Unit Traits 
 
Treatment Group 
  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Bedrooms 472  2.24  1.072 1 8 
Baths 463  1.69  0.824 1 6 
apartment 515  0.65  0.478 0 1 
house 515  0.21  0.409 0 1 
duplex 515  0.01  0.107 0 1 
condo 515  0.08  0.265 0 1 
sqft 360  1,293.14  811.699 1 6812 
Price 510  1,541.14  1058.797 100 8824 
            
      Control Group 
   Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Bedrooms 538  2.06  0.995 1 6 
Baths 529  1.56  0.731 1 6 
apartment 597  0.65  0.477 0 1 
house 597  0.21  0.408 0 1 
duplex 597  0.02  0.135 0 1 
condo 597  0.07  0.253 0 1 
sqft 423  1,188.26  778.872 200 8730 
Price 593  1,526.11  1031.208 165 10,000 
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Table 25: Inquiries by City 
City Treatment Control 
   Atlanta 47 42 
Boston 19 26 
Chicago 29 31 
Dallas 10 13 
Denver 19 14 
Detroit 26 21 
Houston 34 33 
Los Angeles 24 37 
Miami 29 27 
Minneapolis 31 57 
New York 4 4 
Philadelphia 30 29 
Phoenix 16 23 
Riverside 15 16 
San Diego 48 49 
San Francisco 30 39 
Seattle 29 41 
St. Louis 19 28 
Tampa 12 16 
Washington D.C. 44 51 
   Total 515 597 
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Chapter 3 
 
Assessing the Effects of Place-Based Scholarships on Urban Revitalization:  
The Case of Say Yes to Education 
Introduction 
Place-based scholarship programs award grants for college tuition based on residence in a 
specific school district or city rather than merit or need. The Kalamazoo Promise is frequently 
identified as the first, major place-based scholarship program, and since it was announced in 
2005, place-based scholarship programs have been established in over 20 cities and districts 
across the country.22 The scholarship programs are sometimes accompanied by educational 
supports for students and serve as a catalyst for community-wide efforts to improve schools.  
Like other financial aid programs, place-based scholarships seek to improve college access 
among groups that are underrepresented in higher education. Unlike other financial aid 
programs, however, place-based scholarships often explicitly include local community 
development goals. These programs have typically been established in central cities that have 
high rates of poverty and that have experienced economic decline. By offering generous 
educational benefits to residents, the scholarships may create an important locational advantage 
to these areas in efforts to attract new residents and businesses. Thus, these programs are often 
promoted as a potential catalyst for local economic development (Miller-Adams, 2015).  
This article examines the impacts of a prominent place-based scholarship program, Say Yes to 
Education. Specifically, we examine changes in school enrollments and housing prices following 
the initiation of the Say Yes to Education program in Syracuse, New York in 2008 and in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See the list compiled by Michelle Miller-Adams at the Upjohn Institute, 
http://www.upjohn.org/sites/default/files/promise/Lumina/Promisescholarshipprograms.pdf?_ga=1.266472014.1147411544.1394049270. The list 
includes 21 district-wide programs, that provide substantial funding for multiple years that can be used at a range of colleges state- or nation-
wide. At least two of those programs, New Haven Promise and Hartford Promise, use significant merit-based criteria as well as residency 
requirements in making awards, and some of these programs, such as Denver’s, combine place-based targeting with financial need criteria. 
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Buffalo, New York in 2012. Changes in enrollments and housing prices are indicators of the 
extent to which these cities are attracting or retaining residents, which is the primary mechanism 
through which place-based scholarship programs may spark community revitalization. 
Existing studies of the effects of place-based scholarships on enrollments and housing prices 
have typically focused on a single program in a single location, such as the Kalamazoo Promise, 
which limits the ability to draw more general conclusions or to examine the heterogeneity of 
effects across locations. Also, the time frame and research designs of previous studies make it 
difficult to separate the effects of the programs from the effects of the Great Recession.  
Adoption of placed-based scholarships at two different discrete points in time in different 
locations allows us to provide informative analysis that exploit discontinuities in trends, and help 
to develop a broader perspective on the potential effects of place-based scholarships. 
Examining district enrollment from 2000 through 2014, we find that after years of steady 
declines in enrollments, both Syracuse and Buffalo saw enrollment increases that coincide with 
the adoption of the Say Yes to Education program. These increases occurred at different points in 
time in each city. Over the same post-treatment periods, enrollments continued to decline in the 
suburbs surrounding these cities and in similar upstate New York city school districts without the 
program, suggesting that these increases were city-specific and not due to broader developments 
affecting the region. The fact that enrollment increases are discernible in Buffalo as well as 
Syracuse, and relative to other nearby city school districts makes it unlikely that enrollment 
increases can be attributed to the Great Recession.  Supplementary analyses show that the 
enrollment increases in Syracuse public schools coincided with declines in enrollment in nearby 
suburbs, while increases in enrollment in Buffalo public schools coincided with decreases in 
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private school enrollments in the Buffalo area. Moreover, in each location, enrollment increases 
during the post-Say Yes period were concentrated in the district’s higher performing schools. 
To isolate the impact of Say Yes on housing prices, we use a panel data set on individual home 
sales to estimate hedonic price models that control for neighborhood fixed effects and trends, as 
well as analyses that make use of repeat sales, and which compare housing price changes across 
similar upstate New York cities. The results provide some evidence that increases in housing 
prices accompanied the adoption of Say Yes in Syracuse, but not in Buffalo. These results are 
consistent with findings that enrollment growth in Buffalo may have been driven by students 
who would otherwise have attended private schools, while enrollment growth in Syracuse may 
have been driven by students who would otherwise have attended school in the surrounding 
suburbs. 
The results suggest that the ability of place-based scholarships to attract residents into a central 
city is likely to depend on both the specific provisions of the program and the context in which it 
is implemented, and in the concluding section of this article, we discuss the implications for 
policy and future research. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
provides background on the Say Yes to Education program, placed-based scholarships more 
generally, and the existing research on these programs. Section III describes the data used in our 
analyses. Section IV presents our analysis of enrollments, and Section V lays out our analysis of 
housing market values. The final section of the paper discusses the implications of our findings. 
Background on Say Yes to Education and Place-Based Scholarships 
Say Yes to Education combines “place-based” college scholarships with intensive student 
supports. Former United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, among others, has 
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described the program as a potential model for reviving public schools and spurring economic 
revitalization in the nation’s declining central cities (Mariani, 2009). 
The first district-wide Say Yes initiative was announced in Syracuse, New York in 2008 as a 
partnership between the Say Yes to Education Foundation, the Syracuse City School District 
(SCSD) and Syracuse University. In 2012, Buffalo, New York became the second school district 
to adopt the Say Yes program. The programs in Syracuse and Buffalo share many important 
features. First, neither program places merit-based restrictions on scholarship awards; all 
students who have attended for specified lengths of time, have graduated from the cities’ public 
schools, and who have been admitted to and maintain good standing in college are eligible for 
the award. Second, students from both cities can use the scholarships at the same expansive set 
of colleges that includes all community colleges, all public four-year colleges and universities in 
New York State, and approximately 90 private institutions across the country ranging from Ivy 
League universities to small liberal arts colleges. All students are eligible for free tuition at any 
public university in New York State; for most private institutions, free tuition is limited to 
students with family incomes under $75,000. Students from families with income greater than 
$75,000 who attend a private university are, however, eligible for $5,000 scholarships. Third, the 
scholarship is a last-dollar scholarship; students must apply for any state and federal financial aid 
they are eligible to receive, and Say Yes pays the difference between the amount of aid they 
receive and tuition. Finally, as part of each initiative, the Say Yes foundation has provided staff 
and funding to promote the development of student support services, after- and summer-school 
programs, and school improvement efforts. 
There are differences in program details between the two sites. In Syracuse, scholarships cover 
100 percent of tuition for any city resident who has attended a public school in the city for at 
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least three years prior to graduation. The Buffalo program requires twelve years of attendance in 
the Buffalo Public Schools (BPS) for full tuition, and provides partial tuition scholarships for 
students spending less than twelve years in the BPS. Students entering the BPS in grades 1, 2 and 
3 are eligible for 95 percent scholarships, those entering grades 4, 5 and 6 are eligible for 80 
percent scholarships and those entering in grades 7, 8 and 9 are eligible for 65 percent 
scholarships. Also, students in Syracuse are eligible for full-tuition scholarships at Syracuse 
University regardless of family income, while students in Buffalo have a $100,000 income cap 
for Syracuse University. The Say Yes foundation works with each district to identify student 
needs and community priorities, and then coordinates with the district, other local governments, 
and community groups to fill service gaps. Consequently, the set of student support services and 
school improvement efforts that Say Yes supports differs across the two cities. 
In a review of “place-based” scholarship programs, Miller-Adams (2015) emphasizes that 
programs across the country differ in potentially important features—including eligibility 
requirements, participating colleges and universities, and accompanying initiatives. The Say Yes 
programs in Syracuse and Buffalo are similar to the Kalamazoo Promise program in that they 
place minimal restrictions on scholarship eligibility. This feature distinguishes what Miller-
Adams calls “universal programs” from the programs in Pittsburgh, New Haven, and Hartford 
that have more restrictive GPA and attendance requirements. Also, many programs provide 
scholarships for a single local college or a very limited set of local colleges. Even some of the 
more expansive programs, including the Kalamazoo Promise, are limited to in-state, public 
colleges and universities. In contrast, Say Yes students can receive scholarships at a wide range 
of private institutions across the country as well as in-state public colleges and universities.  
Finally, while the introduction of place-based scholarships often spurs school improvement 
87	  
	  
efforts and community-wide action to improve student and family supports, such efforts are more 
explicitly part of the Say Yes intervention than in some other locations. Despite the differences 
across place-based scholarship programs, Say Yes to Education shares with these other programs 
the goals of increasing college access, building a college-going culture, and spurring community 
development by offering well publicized scholarships based primarily on place of residence and 
a credible guarantee that scholarship offers will continue long-term (Miller-Adams, 2015). 
An element of place-based scholarships that distinguishes them from other financial aid 
programs is the explicit goal of promoting local economic development. The residency 
requirements of place-based scholarships are “widely interpreted as a strategy to draw families 
into the area’s urban core and retain those already there” (Miller-Adams, 2015).  Changes in 
district enrollments and housing values can be viewed as indicators of whether place-based 
scholarship programs are helping to promote this goal.  
Most of the evidence on the impacts of place-based scholarships on enrollments and housing 
values come from evaluations of the Kalamazoo Promise program. Initial analyses found that 
enrollment in the Kalamazoo public schools increased by 12 percent in the two years 
immediately following announcement of the Promise program, after falling by over five percent 
in the three years immediately preceding the announcement (Miron and Cullen, 2008). Bartik, 
Eberts, and Huang (2010) estimated that enrollments in Kalamazoo in 2009 were nearly 25 
percent higher than what they were projected to be in the absence of the program. These authors 
also find that the Promise stabilized the racial-ethnic composition in the district by stemming 
decades of white-flight. Later work finds that the majority of new students in Kalamazoo came 
from other Michigan districts, and most markedly from one adjacent, relatively high poverty 
suburban district (Hershbein, 2013). Evidence from Pittsburgh and El Dorado, Arkansas also 
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found that after many years of steady decline, public school enrollment stabilized following the 
announcement of the Pittsburgh Promise (Ash and Ritter 2014; Gonzalez, Bozick, Tharp-Taylor, 
and Phillips 2011; Iriti, Bickel, and Kaufman 2012).  Miller (2011) uses nine years of data on 
home sales in the county and finds no evidence that the Promise increased home values in 
Kalamazoo despite the positive impacts on enrollment and other school characteristics. 
In an unpublished paper, LeGower and Walsh (2014) estimate enrollment and housing value 
effects across multiple place-based scholarship programs. They find that place-based 
scholarships have been associated with increases in public school enrollments and increases in 
housing prices relative to their surrounding suburbs.23   Comparison with surrounding suburban 
communities, however, is potentially problematic for two reasons.  First, within a metropolitan 
area, enrollments and housing prices in the central city and suburban areas may move in opposite 
directions, making the suburbs a questionable basis for estimating the counterfactual enrollments 
and/or housing prices for the central city.24  Second, if a place-based scholarship serves to draw 
families into the city who would otherwise choose the surrounding suburbs, then enrollment and 
housing prices in the suburbs may themselves be influenced by the treatment.  In addition, given 
the time frame of the analysis conducted by LeGower and Walsh (2014), estimated effects of 
place-based college scholarships may be confounded with the effects of the Great Recession. 
Our analyses add to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, we are able to estimate the 
effects of place-based scholarship programs that are similar in important details but implemented 
in two different places at two distinct points in time. By focusing on two sites, we are able to 
examine possible effects of important institutional details of the program.  For example, while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Syracuse is included in both the samples used to analyze enrollments and housing values, but Buffalo is not. 
24 Below we show evidence that the trends in housing prices in the Buffalo and Syracuse differ substantially from those in their surrounding 
suburbs in the years preceding the announcement of Say Yes.  
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the programs are largely similar in the two cities, Syracuse’s program offers easier eligibility for 
full tuition and free tuition at the city’s largest private university. The two-site focus also allows 
us to examine important contextual factors specific to the two cities, such as changes in the 
private school sector, that could affect our findings.  
Second, our analyses focus on, arguably, the most expansive and generous place-based 
scholarship program and one of the few to include a broad range of elite private higher education 
institutions. The Syracuse program, in particular, sets a very low bar for eligibility (attendance in 
the city schools for grades 10–12) and includes the city’s major private university.  
Third, our strategy for estimating the program’s effects on housing prices differs from that of 
previous work on place-based scholarships, such as LeGower and Walsh (2014) in several 
important regards.  Specifically, our analysis of housing prices includes controls for 
neighborhood-specific trends, allowing us to more precisely identify post-program deviations 
from pre-existing trends.  We find that inclusion of these trends matters—estimates that do not 
control for neighborhood trends differ substantively from those that do (see Appendix, Table 
A1).  Also, we compare enrollment and housing trends to cities drawn from very similar 
metropolitan areas rather than suburban districts in the same metropolitan area.  Given that 
place-based scholarships may draw families from surrounding suburban districts, as discussed 
more fully below, these suburban districts cannot be considered “untreated” for the purposes of 
estimating counterfactuals. Moreover, by using cities in nearby metropolitan areas and by 
examining Syracuse and Buffalo separately, we have more leverage to distinguish the effects of 
Say Yes from those of the Great Recession than analyses based primarily on programs that 
coincide with the onset of the Great Recession.  Finally, we test the appropriateness of the 
comparisons we use and the robustness of our estimates using the synthetic control method. 
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Data 
The enrollment data used in our analyses are from the New York State School Report Cards, 
which report enrollments by grade, ethnicity, and eligibility for free- and reduced-price-lunch, 
English as a second language, and special education services from the fall of 2000 to the fall of 
2014. We augment district enrollment counts provided by the School Report Cards with counts 
of students residing in each district who attend charter schools, which we obtained by request 
from the New York State Education Department.    
In addition to examining enrollment trends in Buffalo and Syracuse, we examine concurrent 
enrollment trends in other public and private schools in the metropolitan areas surrounding 
these cities using data on private school enrollments from the New York State Education 
Department.25 Finally, we also examine trends in Rochester, New York, and its surrounding 
metropolitan area. Rochester is a district located between Buffalo and Syracuse (less than 90 
miles from each) that did not implement the program but had similar student demographics and 
enrollment trends prior to the adoption of Say Yes. 
To examine the effect of Say Yes on housing values, we use data on home sales from the New 
York State Office of Real Property Services (ORPS). These data include the universe of property 
transfers in the state of New York (excluding New York City) from 2000 through the second 
quarter of 2014, and include the sales price and date. We limit our sample to arms-length sales 
and also apply a number of filters to ensure that the data exclude extreme outliers and include 
only valid sales of single residence homes. These files also include property addresses that we 
use to place the properties in Census block. Finally, we link each property to tax assessment 
files, also provided by ORPS, which have a wide range of information on property 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/statistics/nonpublic/home.html 
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characteristics. Because we have sales data for the entire state, we are also able to compare 
changes in Syracuse and Buffalo to changes in other school districts in the surrounding 
metropolitan areas and to changes in Rochester and its surrounding districts. 
Enrollment Analysis 
Figure 12 shows public school enrollment trends for Syracuse, Buffalo, and Rochester, and 
their surrounding suburbs. In each case, enrollment counts include students who reside in the 
district boundaries and who attend either district-run schools or charter schools, as students in 
both types of public school are eligible for Say Yes.  Enrollment counts are normalized so that 
average enrollment in the district (or the set of districts in the cases of the suburban time-series) 
across all years equals 100.26  
As shown in Figure 12, after years of declines, averaging 1.4 percent annually over the eight 
years preceding the announcement of Say Yes in Syracuse, enrollments leveled off in the first 
year and then increased in the second year after Say Yes began. Enrollment in Syracuse 
dropped by 1,376 students, 6.3 percent, in the three years preceding Say Yes, but increased by 
397 students, 1.9 percent, in the three years following the announcement of Say Yes. 
Enrollment was still 908 students higher seven years after Say Yes than in the last year prior to 
Say Yes. In contrast, enrollments in the suburbs surrounding Syracuse continued on their pre-
existing downward trend following the adoption of Say Yes in the city.  
Enrollment patterns in Buffalo are similar to those in Syracuse. After years of declines that 
averaged 1.7 percent annually, enrollment increased by an average of 1.4 percent annually in 
the first three years following the adoption of Say Yes. Over the same period, enrollments in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Specifically, the average enrollment across all years for the district (or set of districts) is subtracted from the enrollment count in each year, 
divided by the average enrollment and multiplied by 100.   
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suburban districts around Buffalo continued to decline.  
Public school enrollments in Rochester, in contrast, do not show clear changes that coincide 
with the adoptions of Say Yes in Syracuse or Buffalo. In the four years following the 
announcement of Say Yes in Syracuse, enrollments in Rochester fell by 220 students, or 0.7 
percent. In the three years following the announcement of Say Yes in Buffalo, enrollments in 
Rochester declined by 452, or 1.4 percent. 
Estimation Methods 
To estimate the changes in enrollments associated with the adoption of Say Yes, we employ 
three analyses. The first uses enrollment data solely from the district that adopted Say Yes to 
estimate the following model:     
 0 1 2 3 4ln 1 2 3 ,= + + + + +t t t t t tY D D D Tβ β β β β ε   (1) 
where ln tY  is the natural log of enrollment in year t;
27 0 4 tTβ β+  represents the intercept and 
slope of the linear enrollment trend in the district; and 1 , 2 ,  and 3t t tD D D  indicate the first, 
second, and third year, respectively, after the announcement of Say Yes in the district.  We 
limit the sample to three years after the announcement of Say Yes, so these dummy variables 
are exhaustive of the post-period.28  This model uses pre-treatment enrollment counts to fit a 
trend line, projects that trend into the post-period, and then 1 2 3, ,  and β β β  measure the 
difference between observed and projected enrollment in each of the post-Say Yes years. 
Because the outcome variable is the log of enrollment, the coefficient estimates (multiplied by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 We use the natural log of raw enrollment in each of the analyses that follow, not normalized enrollment as in Figure 1. 
28 In the case of Buffalo, only three post-treatment years are available in our data.  We also limit the sample to three years post-Say Yes in the 
Syracuse analysis for three reasons—consistency with Buffalo; it allows us to use Buffalo as a comparison for Syracuse because Buffalo was not 
exposed to Say Yes for the first three years after the announcement of Say Yes in Syracuse; and the further into the post-treatment period that a 
pre-treatment trend is projected, the more potential bias there is in impact estimates due to misspecification of the trend and because there are 
more intervening events that complicate interpretation of deviations from trend. 
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100) can be interpreted as percent increase in enrollment associated with Say Yes. 
In the second analysis, we add control districts that have not been exposed to the treatment 
during the period observed.  When analyzing changes in enrollment associated with Say Yes in 
Syracuse we add Buffalo and Rochester to the sample.  When analyzing changes associated 
with Say Yes in Buffalo we add Rochester.  Using these samples, we estimate the following 
model: 
 0 1 2 3 1 2ln 1 2 3it it it it i i t t itY D D D Tβ β β β φ φ γ ε= + + + + + + + . (2)  
In this model, 0 1 2i iTβ φ φ+ + capture the intercept and slope of each district-specific trend line, 
and tγ  captures year-specific enrollment shocks that are common across treatment and 
comparison districts. The estimates of 1 2 3, ,  and β β β  in this model can be interpreted as 
difference-in-differences estimates. Specifically, they capture the difference between the 
deviation from projected trends in the Say Yes district in each post-Say Yes year and the 
deviation from projected trends in the other large city districts in western New York that had 
not (yet) adopted Say Yes. 
The difference-in-differences estimates effectively control for any factors or events that might 
have influenced enrollments in the cities of Syracuse, Buffalo and Rochester similarly. The 
difference-in-differences estimates do not necessarily control for factors that had a unique 
influence on enrollments in a particular metropolitan area during the post-Say Yes period, 
however. Thus, as a robustness check, we implement an alternative estimation strategy that 
controls for any metropolitan-specific shocks that influence all districts in a metropolitan area 
equally. Mechanically, this alternative procedure is computed in the manner of a triple-
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differences estimator, which compares the difference between deviations from trends in the 
treated district and its surrounding suburbs to the similar differences between the central city and 
the suburban districts in the comparison metropolitan area(s). This estimator has the advantage of 
controlling for metropolitan-specific shocks that might coincide with the adoption of Say Yes. If 
Say Yes affected enrollments in the suburbs surrounding the city with the program, however, 
then this triple-differences estimate cannot be interpreted as the increase in enrollment in the Say 
Yes district that resulted from Say Yes. Rather, it should be interpreted as an indicator of 
whether or not Say Yes may have contributed to a divergence (or convergence) in enrollments 
between the city where it was adopted and its surrounding suburbs. 
Specifically, we use enrollments in the treated and comparison districts, and their surrounding 
suburbs to estimate equation (3).  
0 1 2
3 1 2
3
ln ( 1 ) ( 2 )
( 3 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
( 3 ) ,
= + × × + × ×
+ × × + × + ×
+ × + + + +
dct dct dct
dct dct dct
dct d d t ct dct
Y D City Treated D City Treated
D City Treated D City D City
D City T
α α α
α β β
β γ ϕ η ε
  (3)  
where ln Ydct is the log of enrollment in district d in metro area c in year t. For suburban districts, 
we sum enrollment in each year across all the suburban districts in the metropolitan area 
surrounding a particular city district and treat that as a single district.29 1 , 2 ,  and 3t t tD D D  
represent the first, second, and third year after the announcement of Say Yes, City indicates the 
central city of the metropolitan area (Buffalo, Rochester, or Syracuse), and Treated indicates the 
district where Say Yes is adopted. iβ is the difference in the deviation from pre-Say Yes trends 
in the central city district and the suburban districts in the comparison metropolitan area(s) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Grouping suburban districts as a single district is intended as a conservative inference approach that does not inflate sample size. 
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during post-Say Yes year i, and iα is the triple-differences estimate of the effect of Say Yes on 
enrollments.  d dTγ ϕ+ controls for district-specific trends and ctη is a metropolitan area-by-year 
fixed effect.30 
To test the validity of using Buffalo and Rochester as control districts we also conducted 
synthetic control analyses.31  Because the regression-based analyses allow for a range of 
sensitivity and supplementary analysis, we focus our discussion on those results.  The full 
synthetic control analyses are described and the results are reported in an Appendix. 
All models are estimated using eight and four years of pre-Say Yes data, as well as three years of 
post-Say Yes data.  The expansion of charter schools was most rapid during the 2000 to 2005 
period, particularly in Buffalo, and charter school expansion may serve to draw students from 
private schools into the public schools.32  As a result, the estimate of pre-treatment trends based 
on eight years of data might underestimate the declines in enrollments due to underlying 
economic and demographic factors, which can distort estimates of the effects of Say Yes.  For 
this reason, we believe the estimates using four-years of pre-Say Yes data may provide a more 
valid estimate of counterfactual enrollments.  
Results 
Table 26 presents the results of our estimations for Syracuse and Buffalo. In keeping with the 
graphical depiction in Figure 12, the first and fourth columns of the top panel of Table 26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In the difference-in-differences analysis, equation (2), the sample includes only one district in each metropolitan area and so the year fixed 
effect in equation (2) is equivalent to the metropolitan area-by-year fixed-effect used in this analysis. 
31 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
32 Between 2000 and 2005, the percent of public school students residing in the district who attended charter schools increased from 0.2 to 13.3 in 
Buffalo, from 0 to 6.1 in Rochester, and from 0 to 4.9 in Syracuse.  As of 2014, the percent of public school students residing in the district who 
attended charter school was 18.9 in Buffalo, 12.2 in Rochester, and 6.7 in Syracuse.  Students can attend charter schools in Syracuse and Buffalo 
if they live in the suburbs.  However, the counts of charter school students that we include in our district enrollment figures are counts of district 
residents who attend charter schools, not the number of students in charter schools located in the city.  Charter school students who reside in 
Syracuse and Buffalo are eligible for the Say Yes scholarship. 
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indicate that enrollments in Syracuse during the post-Say Yes years are higher than predicted by 
the pre-Say Yes trend. Specifically, three years after the announcement of Say Yes, enrollments 
are approximately 8.6 percent higher than projected when four-years of pre-Say Yes 
observations are used, and 4.1 percent higher when eight-years of pre-Say Yes data are used.  
The estimates are somewhat imprecise though and the estimated increases in enrollments are 
only marginally statistically significant.  
The estimates in columns (1) and (4) of Table 26 quantify the deviations from pre-treatment 
trends evident in Figure 12.  Of course, any non-linear shock that may have coincided with the 
adoption of Say Yes and influenced enrollment could provide an alternative explanation for the 
observed deviations from trend.  To begin ruling out potential alternative explanations, we 
compare deviations in trend in the Say Yes district to those in comparison districts. When the 
enrollment increases associated with Say Yes in Syracuse are estimated using the difference-in-
differences framework of equation (2), as well as the triple-differences framework of equation 
(3), the estimated increases in enrollment associated with Say Yes are smaller.  These smaller 
estimated enrollment increases reflect the fact that the rate of enrollment declines in Buffalo and 
Rochester also slowed during years following the recession of 2008, which coincides with the 
post-Say Yes period for Syracuse. Unlike in Syracuse, however, neither Buffalo nor Rochester 
saw actual increases in enrollments during this period, and both the difference-in-differences and 
triple-differences estimates do show that enrollment increases relative to prior trends during the 
post-Say Yes period were larger in Syracuse than in Buffalo and Rochester. These difference-in-
differences and triple-differences estimates are, however, not reliably different from zero. The 
results of synthetic control analyses, presented in Appendix B, indicate larger enrollment effects 
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for Syracuse—an increase of approximately 4.4 percent—than either the difference-in-
differences or the triple-differences model. 
In the case of Buffalo (in the bottom panel of Table 26), estimated increases in enrollment are 
6.4 percent or 7.5 percent higher than projected trends, depending on whether four or eight years 
of pre-Say Yes observations are used.  The enrollment increases associated with Say Yes are a 
bit more precisely estimated in the case of Buffalo and are statistically significant at conventional 
levels in the sample with eight years of pre-Say Yes observations.  For Buffalo, the difference-
in-differences and triple-differences estimates also indicate that post-Say Yes enrollments 
increased more relative to prior trends than they did in Rochester during the same period. The 
estimated increases in enrollment three years after the adoption of Say Yes in Buffalo are 
approximately 7 to 8 percent when four years of pre-Say Yes data are included and 
approximately 6 percent when eight years of pre-Say Yes data are used, and the estimated 
differences are mostly statistically significant. 33   
These estimates are in line with other evaluations of Promise-type programs, such as LeGower 
and Walsh (2014) who find an approximately 8 percent increase in enrollment for universal 
Promise programs such as Say Yes, and the 9 percent increase above expected trends in El 
Dorado, Arkansas reported by Ash and Ritter (2014) for the El Dorado Promise.  The increase is 
somewhat smaller than the estimate of between an 8 and 25 percent enrollment increase in 
Kalamazoo, depending on the assumptions used in the model (Bartik, Eberts and Huang, 2010).34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Because Buffalo is much larger than any other district in our sample, the synthetic control method primarily uses Rochester to create the 
synthetic control for Buffalo and is not appreciably different from the difference-in-difference model.  We present synthetic control models for 
both Syracuse and Buffalo in the housing results below. 
34 Note that the LeGower and Walsh (2014) estimates use a comparison group of surrounding districts while the Kalamazoo and El Dorado 
estimates are based on pre-post comparisons.  
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Identifying the Source of Enrollment Increases 
If the Say Yes program is drawing new students to city schools, there are three plausible sources 
of these students: schools outside the region, other public schools in the region, and private 
schools. Although we cannot track migration of individual students, we can compare enrollment 
trends across different types of schools in each region. Specifically, for both Syracuse and 
Buffalo, we estimate a version of equation (1) separately for four different sets of schools: the 
central city (Say Yes) district, the adjacent, inner ring suburban public school districts, outer ring 
suburban public school districts in the same county, and private schools. In these estimates, we 
use enrollment counts rather than the log of enrollment, so that we can interpret the estimated 
coefficients on the post-Say Yes variables as changes in enrollment counts relative to projected 
trends.  Table 27 presents the results for Syracuse and Buffalo, respectively. For each analysis 
we use four years prior to the announcement of Say Yes in the focal district to extrapolate 
trends.35 
Table 27 indicates that increases in enrollments above projected trends in Syracuse during the 
Say Yes period were accompanied by decreases in enrollments relative to projected trends in the 
suburban districts around Syracuse. In contrast, enrollment increases relative to projected trends 
in Buffalo were accompanied by decreasing enrollments in private schools in the area, relative to 
pre-existing trends. These results suggest that in Syracuse, the enrollment increases that followed 
the announcement of Say Yes may have been driven by students who otherwise would have 
enrolled in the nearby suburbs, while enrollment increases in Buffalo may have come primarily 
from students who otherwise would have enrolled in private schools. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 2014–15 private school enrollments were not available, and so only two years of post-Say Yes data are included for the Buffalo analysis.  We 
use four years rather than eight to extrapolate trends to minimize potential effects of increases in charter schools in Syracuse, which largely 
occurred from four to eight years before the start of Say Yes in the city.     
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The Catholic Diocese of Buffalo has closed and consolidated a number of Catholic schools in the 
Buffalo area over the last decade, but we do not think Catholic school closures can fully explain 
the deviation from enrollment trends that followed the announcement of Say Yes for several 
reasons. First, the largest set of private school closures (12 of 103 schools) took place in 2006–
07, which is before the window of data used to measure trends in Table 27. We do not observe 
contemporaneous increases in Buffalo Public Schools enrollment during or just before this 
earlier period. Second, the number of private schools was steady in the first two years 
immediately after the announcement of Say Yes. Although the need to close Catholic schools in 
Buffalo was announced by the Diocese in 2011, schools were not actually closed until 2014–15 
(the third year after Say Yes), and the 10 schools that were closed in 2014–15 did not show 
unusual or large drops in enrollment in either of the first two years after the announcement of 
Say Yes.  While it is possible that the threat of closures led some families to choose other 
schools, there is no evidence to suggest they would have chosen Buffalo public schools in the 
absence of Say Yes. 
Heterogeneity in Enrollment Changes 
Table 28 shows estimated deviations from pre-Say Yes enrollment trends by race/ethnicity. Here, 
we estimate equation (2) substituting the log of enrollment by student race for the log of total 
enrollment.  The coefficients compare the deviations from pre-program trends in white and non-
white student enrollments in Syracuse and Buffalo with deviations from trends in each city’s 
comparison districts. In both Syracuse and Buffalo, declines in white enrollment in the years 
leading up to Say Yes were particularly marked. In Syracuse, year-to-year decreases in white 
enrollment averaged 6.4 percent over the ten years preceding Say Yes. In the first three years 
following Say Yes, decreases in white enrollments slowed to an average of 2.9 percent per year. 
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Similarly, in Buffalo, year-to-year decreases in white enrollments averaged 4.6 percent over the 
ten years preceding Say Yes, and slowed to 1.5 percent per year in the three years following the 
announcement of Say Yes. Compared with deviation from projected trends in Rochester and 
Buffalo, the number of white students in Syracuse city public schools increased by over 8 
percent three years after the start of Say Yes, a substantially larger increase than for non-white 
students, though the increase is not significant at conventional levels. As a result, the share of 
white students in Syracuse shows an increase, although that increases in not statistically 
significant.  In Buffalo, there was a significant increase in white students of almost seven 
percent, which was similar to the increase in non-white students. Thus, the share of white 
students in the district did not change over the period.36 
Finally, in Table 29, we shift from district-level to school-level analyses to examine enrollment 
changes by school performance levels. Specifically, we split the sample of elementary schools in 
each district into three groups based on average fourth grade math and English language arts test 
scores in the last year prior to the start of Say Yes. Then, using the sample of schools in each 
treatment districts and its comparison districts, we regress the log of enrollment on indicators of 
post-Say Yes years, school fixed effects, a school-specific time trend, and year fixed effects. 
Note that the sample size is larger than in the previous tables because schools are the unit of 
analysis.  
The Say Yes scholarship offer is more valuable to families who expect to send their children to 
college, and particularly four-year colleges, and thus, we expect that enrollment increases in 
reaction to Say Yes would be concentrated in higher performing schools. Indeed, the results in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 We also examined changes in enrollment of students eligible for free-lunch as well as students not eligible for free-lunch.  However, counts of 
free-lunch eligible students in both treated and untreated districts vary widely around estimated trends during both the pre-treatment and post-
treatment period.  As a result, estimated changes in enrollment by free-lunch eligibility were much too imprecise to be informative. 
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Table 29 indicate that in Syracuse increases in enrollment were limited to middle and high 
performing schools.  In Buffalo, increases in enrollment were more marked in middle and higher 
performing schools in the first two years after the announcement of Say Yes, but not in the third 
Say Yes year.  Although many other factors could be driving larger-than-usual increases in 
higher performing schools, these findings are consistent with the idea that Say Yes is drawing 
students into the district schools. 
In sum, both Syracuse and Buffalo public schools saw enrollment increases relative to projected 
trends controlling for enrollment changes in the similar nearby cities in the three years following 
the announcement of Say Yes. In both districts, the increases in enrollment were concentrated in 
higher performing schools. The increases in enrollments relative to projected trends in Syracuse 
were accompanied by decreases in enrollment relative to the projected trends in the nearby 
suburbs, and the increases in enrollments relative to projected trends in Buffalo were 
accompanied by unusually large decreases in private school enrollments in the area. There is 
some reason to believe that the increase in enrollments following Say Yes in Syracuse were the 
result of more general changes in the mobility of students across the city and the suburbs in 
western and central New York during the years following the Great Recession. It is, however, 
unlikely that private school closure can account for the shift of enrollments from private schools 
to the Buffalo city public schools. 
Housing Market Analysis 
One might suspect that increases in enrollments, particularly if those enrollments are drawn from 
surrounding districts, would be accompanied by increased demand for housing and thus, 
increased housing prices in the central cities. Figure 13 presents a time-series of median 
residential housing sales prices in Syracuse, Buffalo, Rochester, and their surrounding suburbs. 
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Median sale prices are normalized to the average median sales price over all the years within 
each time-series.  
In Syracuse, median home sales prices did, in fact, increase substantially above previous trends 
in the first three years following the adoption of Say Yes, while average prices in the suburbs 
surrounding Syracuse dropped below prior trends over the same period. These changes in trends 
are consistent with people relocating from the suburbs to the central city. A similar pattern in 
housing prices in the central city and its surrounding suburbs is, however, evident for Rochester 
and Buffalo during this period, which suggests that increases in home sales prices in Syracuse in 
the years following the announcement of Say Yes may reflect general changes in metropolitan 
housing markets in western and central New York during the Great Recession, rather than any 
impact of Say Yes. There is no indication of any increases in median home sales prices following 
the announcement of Say Yes in Buffalo in Figure 13. In fact, median home sales prices dropped 
steeply in the years immediately following the announcement of Say Yes, although that decline 
began the year prior to the announcement of Say Yes. 
Of course, the simple time-series of median home prices reflects a wide range of factors. For 
example, the sample of homes sold in a district changes each year, and so changes in median sale 
prices reflect changes in the types of homes being sold as well as changes in the prices of 
individual houses. In this section, we use hedonic housing price models, estimated using 
individual home sales, to try to isolate changes in housing values associated with the adoption of 
Say Yes. 
Estimation Methods 
To estimate the increase in housing values associated with Say Yes, we employ a difference-in-
differences approach comparing deviations from pre-existing trends in house values in the Say 
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Yes districts to deviations from trends in comparison districts during the same period. Figure 13 
suggests pre-Say Yes trends in housing values in Syracuse were similar to those in Buffalo and 
Rochester, and the three cities are also similar in terms of socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, the age of their housing stock, and their role in their larger metropolitan 
economies. Thus, Buffalo and Rochester are appropriate comparisons for Syracuse. For similar 
reasons, Rochester is an appropriate comparison for Buffalo.  
Housing values in the suburbs surrounding Syracuse and Buffalo exhibit different trends than 
those in the cities in the years leading up to Say Yes, thus they may not be appropriate 
comparison districts. Also, if Say Yes attracts families to Syracuse and Buffalo who might 
otherwise choose to live in the nearby suburbs, then the Say Yes program could influence 
housing prices in those suburbs as well, again making it an inappropriate comparison group. 
Nevertheless, the pre-Say Yes trends in housing values in the suburban areas of Syracuse, 
Buffalo, and Rochester are all similar to each other. We exploit this fact to implement an 
alternative estimation strategy discussed below. 
We implement our difference-in-differences estimator in two different ways. First, we use all 
home sales in the treated and comparison districts for the eight years prior to the adoption of Say 
Yes and the three years following the adoption of Say Yes37 to estimate a regression that controls 
for neighborhood fixed effects and trends as well as individual housing characteristics.38 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 For Syracuse, we use Rochester and Buffalo as the comparison districts, and for Buffalo, we use Rochester as the comparison. We also 
computed estimates using four years of pre-Say Yes observations, and the results were substantively very similar, although less precise.  In 
contrast to the enrollment analysis, we do not expect the increases in charter schools in Syracuse that occurred four to eight years before the start 
of Say Yes to affect housing prices.  We, therefore, report the results using eight years of pre-Say Yes data here. The results using four years of 
pre-Say Yes data are reported in Appendix Table A2. 
38 Housing characteristics included as controls are square feet of living area, square feet of garage and basement, overall condition, age of home, 
number of stories, number of rooms, number of bedrooms, number of full bathrooms, number of half bathrooms, whether or not there is a 
finished recreational room, whether or not the house has central air conditioning, and heat type. 
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where the outcome variable is the log of the sales price for property i in census tract n in year t; 
the treatment variables are defined as they were in the enrollment analysis; X is a vector of 
housing characteristics; n n tTγ ϕ+  are the intercept and slope of a neighborhood-specific trend,
39 
and tη is a year-specific effect. The strength of this first strategy is that it uses all housing sales in 
the district to estimate effects. However, it only provides adequate control for changes in the 
types of houses sold each year if—controlling for observed housing characteristics—homes sold 
within neighborhoods are sufficiently homogeneous. 
The second strategy to control for changes in the types of homes sold is to limit the sample to 
homes that have sold multiple times, and estimate the following regression. 
0 1 2 3lnP 1 2 3 .= + + + + + + +int nt nt nt i n t t intD D D Tα α α α λ ϕ η ν   (5) 
In this regression, we replace the neighborhood fixed effect in equation (4) with an individual 
property fixed effect, which is possible because each home is observed multiple times. We 
continue to control for neighborhood trends. Because we only observe housing characteristics at 
a single point in time, their effect on housing prices cannot be estimated separately from the 
individual property fixed effect and thus drop out of this model. Including the individual housing 
fixed effect provides a more complete control for changes in the types of housing sold in 
different years. In this model, however, the effects of Say Yes are identified by changes in the 
price of homes sold multiple times in a relatively short period of time, which may be 
unrepresentative of changes in values across all homes that are sold. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Inclusion of the neighborhood specific trend term is substantively important.  Estimated effects of Say Yes on property values in both Syracuse 
and Buffalo are consistently and substantially more positive in models that exclude the control for neighborhood specific trends.  See Appendix 
Table A1 for a comparison of coefficients. 
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Conducting proper inferences for estimates of the treatment effects in equations (4) and (5), iα , 
is not straightforward. Although we observe thousands of individual home sales, these sales are 
clustered in three districts in the case of the estimated impact of Say Yes in Syracuse, and only 
two districts in the case of Say Yes in Buffalo, and in each case, there is only one treated cluster. 
In the presence of this type of clustering, standard error estimates that assume independent 
observations can be biased downward substantially. The standard solution to this problem—
cluster robust standard errors—relies on having a large number of treated and comparison group 
clusters, which clearly is not the case here (Wooldridge, 2003, 2006; Donald and Lang, 2007; 
Conley and Taber, 2011; Cameron and Miller, 2015).   
To conduct proper inferences, and specifically to obtain correct p-values, we estimate equations 
(4) and (5) using the two-step procedure suggested by Donald and Lang (2007). In the first step, 
the log of housing prices are regressed on all variables that vary at the individual or 
neighborhood level (namely, the individual property covariates, neighborhood or property fixed 
effects, neighborhood trends), and a set of district-by-year fixed effects. In the second step, the 
estimated district-by-year fixed effects are regressed on variables that vary at the district level, 
namely the treatment variables, a district-specific time trend, and year fixed effects, weighting by 
the number of observations in each district-by-year. As demonstrated by Donald and Lang 
(2007), this two-step procedure is an efficient estimator and provides appropriate p-values in the 
case of a small number of clusters under relatively unrestrictive assumptions. 
As in the enrollment analysis, we conducted synthetic control analyses to test the validity of 
using Rochester and Buffalo as comparisons in our difference-in-differences analysis.  These 
analyses and their results are described in Appendix B. 
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The difference-in-differences estimates effectively control for any factors that might have 
influenced property values in Syracuse, Buffalo, and Rochester similarly. However, the 
difference-in-differences estimates do not necessarily control for factors that had a unique 
influence on property values in a particular metropolitan area during the post-Say Yes period. 
Thus, as a robustness check, we again use a triple-differences estimator, which compares the 
difference between deviations from trends in the treated district and its surrounding suburbs to 
the similar differences between the central city and the suburban districts in the comparison 
metropolitan area(s). As in the enrollment analysis, this estimator has the advantage of 
controlling for metropolitan-specific shocks that might coincide with the adoption of Say Yes, 
and should be interpreted as an indicator of whether or not Say Yes may have contributed to a 
divergence (or convergence) in housing prices between the city where it was adopted and its 
surrounding suburbs. 
Specifically, we use data on all home sales in the treated and comparison districts, and their 
surrounding suburbs to estimate equation (6).  
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As in estimation of the difference-in-differences, we control for individual housing 
characteristics, neighborhood-specific fixed effects and trends, and in this case, metropolitan-by-
year fixed effects, mtη . As in the enrollment analysis, iβ is the difference in the deviation from 
pre-Say Yes trends in the central city district and districts in the comparison metropolitan area(s) 
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during post-Say Yes year i, and iα is the triple-differences estimate of the effect of Say Yes on 
the log of property values. We also estimate an equation similar to (6) in which we replace the 
individual property covariates and neighborhood fixed effects with an individual property fixed 
effect using properties with multiple sales. To ensure proper inferences, we estimate both the all 
sales and repeated sales regression using the two-step procedure that we used to implement the 
difference-in-differences estimator. 
Results 
Table 30 displays the results of our primary housing value analysis. For both the difference-in-
differences and the triple-differences analyses, estimated changes in housing values associated 
with Say Yes are similar whether all sales or multiple sales are used. The triple-differences 
estimates tend to be larger in absolute value and less precise than the corresponding difference-
in-differences estimates. Nonetheless, the results from the difference-in-differences and the 
triple-differences are qualitatively similar. 
Both the difference-in-differences and triple-differences suggest that Syracuse experienced a 
larger increase in property values after Say Yes relative to pre-existing neighborhood trends than 
did Rochester and Buffalo. The results are statistically significant only in the case of the triple-
differences estimates during the third year after the announcement of Say Yes, which show 
rather large increases of between 14 and 17 percent. Overall, the estimated increases in property 
values associated with the adoption of Say Yes in Syracuse ranged between 6.5 percent and 16.9 
percent depending on the sample and model. These results are similar to the estimates of 6 
percent to 12 percent reported by LeGower and Walsh (2014) using their pooled sample and in 
contrast to early estimates in Kalamazoo that found no effect on housing prices (Miller, 2011; 
Miller-Adams, 2010). 
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The fact that the triple-differences estimates are larger than the difference-in-differences 
estimates for Syracuse suggests that the announcement of Say Yes is associated with decreases in 
property values in the surrounding suburbs as well as increases in property values in Syracuse.  
To test that hypothesis more directly, we computed difference-in-differences estimates of the 
effect of Say Yes on property values in the suburbs around Syracuse.  To compute these 
difference-in-differences, we estimate equations (4) and (5) above using the sample of home 
sales in the Syracuse, Rochester, and Buffalo suburbs during the eight years preceding and three 
years following the announcement of Say Yes in Syracuse, and consider the homes sales in the 
Syracuse suburbs following the announcement as treated observations. 
The results of this analysis of suburban property values is presented in Table 31.  As implied by 
the results in Table 5, the changes in properties values in the Syracuse suburbs associated with 
the adoption of Say Yes are negative and large, and are also statistically significant.  Three years 
after the adoption of Say Yes in Syracuse properties values in the suburbs decreased between 7 
percent and 9 percent, relative to the projection of pre-existing trends and controlling for 
deviations from projected trends observed in the Rochester and Buffalo suburbs during the same 
time period.  The results in Table 6 indicate that the announcement of Say Yes was associated 
with both increases in property values in the city and decreases in property values in the 
surrounding suburbs, which is consistent with the idea that people who might otherwise have 
lived in the suburbs moved to or remained in the city. 
Returning to Table 30, the estimated changes in property values associated with Say Yes in 
Buffalo are all negative. The triple-differences estimates are slightly more negative, but also less 
precise, than the difference-in-differences estimates. The estimated changes in housing values 
are statistically significant only for the second year after the adoption of Say Yes, when all sales 
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are used. The estimated second-year changes in the multiple sales sample, when more complete 
controls for housing characteristics are employed, are less precise and not statistically different 
from zero. 
Although the results in the bottom panel of Table 30 suggest that a decline in property values in 
Buffalo relative to projections may have accompanied the adoption of Say Yes, Figure 13 
suggests that the start of the decline preceded the start of the program. To test this possibility, we 
add to each of the models estimated in Table 30 variables indicating the first, second, and third 
year pre-Say Yes. If the estimated coefficients on the post-Say Yes variables move closer to zero 
(or change signs), or the coefficients on the pre-treatment variables are similar to the post 
treatment variables, it suggests that prices may have started to change before the start of Say Yes 
and the estimates in Table 5 may not reflect the causal impacts of the program.  
The results of this “event history” analysis are presented in Table 32 (Syracuse) and Table 33 
(Buffalo). In Syracuse, the coefficients for the pre-Say Yes years are largely, though not always, 
positive and are not significant in any model. The post-Say Yes coefficients are substantially 
larger than the pre-Say Yes coefficients. The post-Say Yes coefficient are also slightly larger in 
this model than in the previous models, and still significant in the triple-differences model for the 
third year of Say Yes. Thus, the estimates do not provide any indication that the observed 
housing market changes began before the start of Say Yes in Syracuse. Table 33 shows that the 
post-Say Yes coefficients are much smaller than the pre-Say Yes coefficient estimates and the 
estimates in Table 30, and no longer significant, suggesting that the price decreases in Buffalo 
were not the result of Say Yes. 
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We also used the synthetic control method to create counterfactuals for Syracuse and Buffalo 
housing prices (full results presented in Appendix B: Analysis of Housing Price Changes using 
Synthetic Control Method).  For both Syracuse and Buffalo, Rochester receives the majority of 
weight in constructing the synthetic control, which validates our reliance on Rochester as a 
comparison city in the regression analyses. We find that the housing price increase in Syracuse 
after Say Yes was substantially larger than in its synthetic control, and larger than those found in 
the difference-in-differences analyses.  As in the difference-in-differences models, the synthetic 
control analysis finds no evidence of housing price increases in Buffalo after the start of Say 
Yes.  Thus, the synthetic control analyses suggest that the results are robust to the use of 
alternative methods.  
We also estimated the changes in housing values associated with the adoption of Say Yes by 
neighborhood income level. Specifically, we divided the sample of treatment and control 
neighborhoods into thirds based on median housing income in the neighborhood. We then 
estimated our difference-in-differences models for each sample separately. The results suggest 
that changes in property values associated with the adoption of Say Yes were concentrated in 
low and middle-income neighborhoods in Syracuse and in low-income neighborhoods in 
Buffalo. However, the estimates of changes in housing values were generally quite noisy and 
thus, we are reluctant to draw any strong conclusions from this analysis. 
Summary and Discussion 
The analyses presented above examine potential early indicators of urban revitalization—school 
district enrollments and housing prices—in Syracuse and Buffalo, New York in the wake of Say 
Yes to Education’s start in each city. We find consistent evidence of enrollment increases in both 
Syracuse and Buffalo following the announcement of the program and that these increases 
111	  
	  
occurred after years of largely declining enrollments. Moreover, the increases coincided with the 
start of the program and grew over time, though the program began in different years in each 
city. While the Syracuse increases were accompanied by large enrollment declines in 
surrounding suburban districts, the Buffalo increases coincided with large declines in private 
school enrollments in the area. The increases in both cities, and particularly in Syracuse, appear 
to be largely concentrated in the districts’ highest performing schools.  It must be noted, 
however, that the cities of Buffalo and Rochester also saw enrollment increases relative to 
projected trends following the announcement of Say Yes in Syracuse, suggesting that at least 
part of the increase in enrollments in Syracuse might be attributable to factors other than Say 
Yes. 
Using difference-in-differences and triple-differences models, we find evidence of substantively 
meaningful increases in home prices in Syracuse after the program’s announcement, as well as 
decreases in housing values in the suburbs surrounding Syracuse, both of which are consistent 
with the hypothesis that Say Yes helped to attract to the city people who would otherwise have 
located in the suburbs. We do not find evidence of similar housing price changes in Buffalo.  The 
Syracuse results also suggest that much of the program’s effect may be to shift locational 
decisions within, but not across, metropolitan areas. 
These results, then, raise questions about why responses to the program would be different in 
Syracuse than in Buffalo. We have no definitive answers, but it is quite likely that the different 
contexts and program benefits between the two cities may help to explain the findings. First, the 
Syracuse program is arguably more generous than the Buffalo program. Syracuse requires only 
three years of high school attendance for full scholarship eligibility, while Buffalo requires 
twelve years. Additionally, tuition at Syracuse University, listed at over $40,000 per year during 
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this period, is available for all Syracuse Say Yes students but only for those from families with 
income under $100,000 in Buffalo.  Given its location, Syracuse University is also likely to be a 
more attractive option for students from Syracuse than from Buffalo.  The more generous 
benefits available in Syracuse may be more likely to induce families to move from the suburbs to 
the city, or to stay in the city, to take advantage of the program, thereby increasing demand for 
housing. In Buffalo, the program appears to have drawn students largely from private schools. If 
these families already lived in the city, the housing market effects would likely be smaller. 
The contexts of Syracuse and Buffalo may also help to explain some of the differences in 
responses to Say Yes across the two cities. As described above, Buffalo’s large Catholic school 
sector was undergoing consolidation and closures during the years before Say Yes began. While 
these events did not coincide with the start of Say Yes, the uncertainty surrounding private 
schools, combined with the programmatic and scholarship benefits of Say Yes, may have 
accelerated movement toward city public schools. In Syracuse, with a smaller private school 
sector, suburban schools may represent the more relevant alternative for many parents who do 
not want to send their children to public city schools. Ultimately, though, understanding the 
mechanisms underlying these differential effects is worthy of additional study in future research. 
The results also provide some evidence on the potential for place-based scholarships to spur 
economic revitalization in distressed cities.  Both Syracuse and Buffalo have suffered through 
decades of economic decline and shrinking tax bases.  Between 1950 and 2000, Buffalo lost half 
of its population, the fourth largest decline among large cities in the United States, while 
Syracuse lost one-third of its population (Office of the New York State Comptroller, 2004).  
Evidence from the Say Yes to Education program suggests that providing a substantial and 
highly visible amenity such as free college tuition may be effective at stemming these ongoing 
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population losses and inducing some households to remain in central cities or to move from 
nearby suburbs, though the magnitude of the effect may be modest.  From a metropolitan 
perspective, this growth may be a zero sum game, with gains in cities offset by losses in 
neighboring communities.  Additionally, providing free college to large numbers of students may 
be an expensive model if the gains are small, though the last-dollar nature of the scholarships 
reduces overall costs. Future work will be needed to determine whether these cities are able to 
maintain the enrollment gains and whether they are, in fact, leading indicators of broader 
economic development. 
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Figure 12: Enrollment Trends, Cities and Suburbs 
 
Panel A: Syracuse City School District vs. Other Districts in Onondaga County 
 
Panel B: Buffalo City School District vs. Other Districts in Erie County 
 
Panel C: Rochester City School District vs. Other Districts in Monroe County 
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Figure 13: Median housing values, cities and suburbs 
 
Panel A. Syracuse vs. Its Suburbs 
 
 
Panel B. Buffalo vs. Its Suburbs 
 
 
Panel C. Rochester vs. Its Suburb 
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Table 26: Changes in Enrollment Trends Associated with Adoption of Say Yes 
 Four-years pre-Say Yes included  Eight-years pre-Say Yes included 
 
 
Variable 
 
Pre- 
post 
Difference- 
in-
differences 
 
Triple- 
differences 
 
 
Pre- 
post 
Difference- 
in-
differences 
 
Triple- 
differences 
 
 
Panel A: Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.018 
(0.016) 
[0.368] 
−0.004 
(0.019) 
[0.829] 
−0.007 
(0.018) 
[0.716] 
 
−0.006 
(0.015) 
[0.705] 
−0.014 
(0.017) 
[0.420] 
−0.011 
(0.017) 
[0.516] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.062* 
(0.019) 
[0.083] 
0.019 
(0.023) 
[0.425] 
0.019 
(0.022) 
[0.404] 
 
0.027 
(0.017) 
[0.126] 
0.004 
(0.018) 
[0.811] 
0.012 
(0.018) 
[0.515] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.086* 
(0.023) 
[0.064] 
0.032 
(0.027) 
[0.277] 
0.030 
(0.026) 
[0.284] 
 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
[0.060] 
0.012 
(0.019) 
[0.539] 
0.020 
(0.019) 
[0.315] 
No. of observations 7 21 42  11 33 66 
 
 
Panel B: Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.013 
(0.011) 
[0.349] 
0.037 
(0.012) 
[0.150] 
0.041** 
(0.011) 
[0.018] 
 
0.025 
(0.013) 
[0.155] 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
[0.065] 
0.032 
(0.033) 
[0.351] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.047* 
(0.014) 
[0.075] 
0.057* 
(0.015) 
[0.060] 
0.064*** 
(0.013) 
[0.008] 
 
0.056*** 
(0.013) 
[0.006] 
0.046** 
(0.014) 
[0.016] 
0.053 
(0.036) 
[0.163] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.064* 
(0.016) 
[0.059] 
0.069* 
(0.017) 
[0.057] 
0.080*** 
(0.015) 
[0.007] 
 
0.075*** 
(0.014) 
[0.002] 
0.057*** 
(0.015) 
[0.009] 
0.065 
(0.038) 
[0.112] 
No. of observations 7 14 28  11 22 44 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regression. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of enrollment. “Pre-post” correspond to equation (1), “Difference-in-differences” correspond 
to equation (2), and “Triple-differences” correspond to equation (3). Estimates include controls for pre-
Say Yes enrollment trends. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from 
zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and 
*** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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Table 27: Changes in Enrollment Trends Associated with Adoption of Say Yes, by Type of 
District 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
 
Countywide 
 
City 
public 
schools 
 
Public schools 
in adjacent 
districts 
Public schools 
in other 
districts in 
the county 
 
 
Private 
schools 
 
 
Panel A: Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
115 
(573) 
394 
(335) 
−328** 
(75) 
−176 
(131) 
226 
(396) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
523 
(697) 
1,323* 
(407) 
−544** 
(92) 
−550* 
(160) 
294 
(481) 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
776 
(834) 
1,839* 
(488) 
−585** 
(110) 
−856** 
(191) 
379 
(576) 
No. of observations 7 7 7 7 7 
  Panel B: Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
−851 
(546) 
518 
(430) 
−3 
(104) 
−16 
(175) 
−1,350* 
(341) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
806 
(664) 
1,804* 
(524) 
−84 
(126) 
209 
(213) 
−1,122* 
(415) 
No. of observations 6 6 6 6 6 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses, from 
separate estimation of equation (1), each using four years of pre-Say Yes observations. Untransformed 
enrollment counts, rather than the natural log of enrollment counts, are used as outcome variables. 
Estimates include controls for pre-Say Yes enrollment trends. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.05, *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable 
from zero at 0.01. 
  
120	  
	  
Table 28: Change in Trends in Enrollment Associated with Adoption of Say Yes, by Race 
 Difference-in-differences estimates  
 
Variable 
 
ln white enrollment 
ln non-white 
enrollment 
 
Share white 
  Panel A: Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.030 
(0.030) 
−0.006 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
0.096** 
(0.037) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
0.019 
(0.007) 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
0.082 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.046) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
No. of observations 21 21 21 
 
 
Panel B: Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.048** 
(0.004) 
0.042 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
0.066** 
(0.005) 
0.095* 
(0.024) 
−0.002 
(0.005) 
No. of observations 12 12 12 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses, from 
separate estimates of equation (2). The outcome variable in each regression is the natural log of 
enrollment. Estimates include controls for pre-Say Yes enrollment trends estimated using four years of 
pre-Say Yes observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero 
at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.05. 
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Table 29: Changes in Enrollment Trends Associated with Adoption of Say Yes, By School 
Variable Low-performing Middle-performing High-performing 
 
 
Panel A: Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.016 
(0.053) 
0.175*** 
(0.063) 
0.178*** 
(0.059) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
0.025 
(0.045) 
0.101** 
(0.048) 
0.113** 
(0.047) 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
0.002 
(0.036) 
0.092** 
(0.045) 
0.057 
(0.038) 
No. of observations 203 201 196 
 
 
Panel B: Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.050 
(0.065) 
0.116* 
(0.059) 
0.083 
(0.079) 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.054 
(0.054) 
0.061 
(0.049) 
0.114* 
(0.065) 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.016 
(0.044) 
0.010 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
No. of observations 147 147 140 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors in parentheses, from 
separate regressions. Regression equation estimated in each case is similar to equation (2) except district-
specific trends are replaced with school-specific trends. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of enrollment. All estimates are based on four-year pre-Say Yes and three-year post Say Yes 
observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and ***indicates 
that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
 
 
  
122	  
	  
Table 30: Changes in Housing Prices Associated with Adoption of Say Yes 
 
Variable 
Diff.-in-diff. 
all sales 
Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales 
Triple-diff. 
all sales 
Triple-diff. 
multiple sales 
 
 
Panel A. Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.052 
(0.035) 
[0.159] 
0.046 
(0.045) 
[0.317] 
0.071 
(0.046) 
[0.136] 
0.089 
(0.064) 
[0.174] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
0.022 
(0.036) 
[0.544] 
0.016 
(0.046) 
[0.731] 
0.075 
(0.064) 
[0.119] 
0.089 
(0.066) 
[0.189] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
0.065 
(0.044) 
[0.159] 
0.068 
(0.056) 
[0.243] 
0.143** 
(0.057) 
[0.020] 
0.169** 
(0.079) 
[0.044] 
District-by-year obs. 33 33 66 66 
Individual property sales 49,624 23,540 270,011 115,324 
  Panel B. Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.024 
(0.035) 
[0.518] 
−0.028 
(0.044) 
[0.552] 
−0.042 
(0.048) 
[0.399] 
−0.060 
(0.067) 
[0.390] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
  −0.097** 
(0.036) 
[0.035] 
−0.072 
(0.044) 
[0.154] 
−0.111** 
(0.049) 
[0.035] 
−0.107 
(0.069) 
[0.146] 
District-by-year obs. 20 20 40 40 
Individual property sales 39,112 18,989 186,554 80,530 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions.  The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. “Diff.-in-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (4), “Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales” correspond to equation (5), and “Triple-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (5). “Triple-
diff. multiple sales” is based on equation similar to equation (5) with individual property covariates and 
neighborhood fixed effects replaced by individual property fixed effects. All estimates are based on eight-
year pre-Say Yes and three-year post Say-Yes observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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Table 31: Changes in Housing Prices in the Syracuse Suburbs Associated with Adoption of Say 
Yes 
 
Variable 
Diff.-in-diff. 
all sales 
Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.012 
(0.013) 
[0.338] 
−0.035** 
(0.016) 
[0.046] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.047*** 
(0.013) 
[0.002] 
−0.072*** 
(0.016) 
[0.000] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.072*** 
(0.015) 
[0.000] 
−0.094*** 
(0.019) 
[0.000] 
District-by-year observations 33 33 
Individual property sales 49,624 23,540 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. “Diff.-in-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (4), “Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales” correspond to equation (5). All estimates are based on samples that include eight-year pre-
Say Yes and three-year post Say-Yes observations of home sales in suburban areas around Syracuse, 
Buffalo, and Rochester. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 
0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and *** 
indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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Table 32: Changes in Housing Prices Associated with Adoption of Say Yes in Syracuse 
 
Variable 
Diff.-in-diff. 
all sales 
Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales 
Triple-diff. 
all sales 
Triple-diff. 
multiple sales 
3 year pre Say yes 0.036 
(0.044) 
[0.322] 
0.039 
(0.056) 
[0.337] 
0.046 
(0.036) 
[0.217] 
0.027 
(0.041) 
[0.518] 
2 year pre Say Yes 0.004 
(0.036) 
[0.916] 
−0.025 
(0.046) 
[0.604] 
−0.003 
(0.043) 
[0.948] 
−0.065 
(0.049) 
[0.200] 
1 year pre Say Yes 0.037 
(0.035) 
[0.477] 
0.068 
(0.045) 
[0.253] 
0.041 
(0.052) 
[0.435] 
0.058 
(0.058) 
[0.335] 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.083 
(0.035) 
[0.192] 
0.080 
(0.045) 
[0.255] 
0.103 
(0.062) 
[0.117] 
0.097 
(0.069) 
[0.179] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.058 
(0.036) 
[0.400] 
0.056 
(0.046) 
[0.471] 
0.112 
(0.068) 
[0.124] 
0.098 
(0.077) 
[0.221] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.106 
(0.045) 
[0.200] 
0.113 
(0.056) 
[0.219] 
0.184** 
(0.079) 
[0.036] 
0.180* 
(0.089) 
[0.062] 
District-by-year observations 33 33 66 66 
Individual property sales 49,624 23,540 270,011 115,324 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. “Diff.-in-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (4), “Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales” correspond to equation (5), and “Triple-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (5). “Triple-
diff. multiple sales” is based on equation similar to equation (5) with individual property covariates and 
neighborhood fixed effects replaced by individual property fixed effects. All estimates are based on eight- 
year pre-Say Yes and three-year post Say Yes observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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Table 33: Changes in Housing Prices Associated with Adoption of Say Yes in Buffalo 
 
Variable 
Diff.-in-diff. 
all sales 
Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales 
Triple-diff. 
all sales 
Triple-diff. 
multiple sales 
3 year pre Say yes 0.026 
(0.035) 
[0.508] 
0.037 
(0.039) 
[0.416] 
0.011 
(0.044) 
[0.812] 
0.031 
(0.067) 
[0.661] 
2 year pre Say Yes 0.084 
(0.043) 
[0.148] 
0.117* 
(0.048) 
[0.094] 
0.065 
(0.055) 
[0.281] 
0.103 
(0.083) 
[0.262] 
1 year pre Say Yes 0.044 
(0.048) 
[0.430] 
0.057 
(0.053) 
[0.362] 
0.031 
(0.061) 
[0.632] 
0.055 
(0.092) 
[0.566] 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.033 
(0.053) 
[0.579] 
0.051 
(0.059) 
[0.454] 
−0.003 
(0.067) 
[0.971] 
0.011 
(0.102) 
[0.915] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
−0.031 
(0.059) 
[0.629] 
0.018 
(0.065) 
[0.803] 
−0.072 
(0.074) 
[0.373] 
−0.025 
(0.113) 
[0.833] 
District-by-year observations 20 20 40 40 
Individual property sales 39,112 18,989 186,554 80,530 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. “Diff.-in-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (4), “Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales” correspond to equation (5), and “Triple-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (5). “Triple-
diff. multiple sales” is based on equation similar to equation (5) with individual property covariates and 
neighborhood fixed effects replaced by individual property fixed effects. All estimates are based on eight- 
year pre-Say Yes and three-year post Say Yes observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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APPENDIX A: Alternative Specifications of Housing Price Analyses 
 
 
Table 34: Changes in Housing Prices Associated with Adoption of Say Yes, with and without 
Controls for Tract-Specific Trends 
 Syracuse  Buffalo 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Tract F.E. 
Tract F.E. 
&  
Tract trends 
   
 
Tract F.E. 
Tract F.E. 
&  
Tract trends 
1 year post Say Yes 0.082 
(0.050) 
[0.117] 
0.052 
(0.035) 
[0.159] 
 0.062 
(0.060) 
[0.332] 
−0.024 
(0.035) 
[0.518] 
2 year post Say Yes 0.051 
(0.047) 
[0.294] 
0.022 
(0.036) 
[0.544] 
 −0.007 
(0.055) 
[0.901] 
−0.097** 
(0.036) 
[0.035] 
3 year post Say Yes 0.124** 
(0.058) 
[0.049] 
0.065 
(0.044) 
[0.159] 
              —               — 
District-by-year obs. 33 33  20 20 
Individual property sales 49,624   49,624    39,112    39,112 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. Models include controls for individual property characteristics and 
month-by-year fixed as well as tract fixed effects and tract trends.  Syracuse model is estimated using all 
home sales in Syracuse, Rochester and Buffalo during eight years pre-Say Yes and three years post Say-
Yes. Buffalo model is estimated using all home sales in Buffalo and Rochester during eight years pre-Say 
Yes and two years post-Say Yes. ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable 
from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero 
at 0.01. 
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Table 35: Changes in Housing Prices Associated with Adoption of Say Yes, Using Four Years of 
Pre-Say Yes Data 
 
 
Diff.-in-diff. 
all sales 
Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales 
Triple-diff. 
all sales 
Triple-diff. 
multiple sales 
 
 
Panel A. Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
0.046 
(0.046) 
[0.346] 
0.032 
(0.069) 
[0.660] 
0.064 
(0.049) 
[0.226] 
0.078 
(0.075) 
[0.320] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
0.018 
(0.053) 
[0.741] 
−0.005 
(0.081) 
[0.950] 
0.070 
(0.056) 
[0.248] 
0.074 
(0.087) 
[0.147] 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
0.060 
(0.066) 
[0.398] 
0.038 
(0.010) 
[0.718] 
0.136* 
(0.071) 
[0.089] 
0.147 
(0.109) 
[0.207] 
District-by-year observations 21 21 42 42 
Individual property sales 35,821 16,668 175,494 75,012 
  Panel B. Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.050 
(0.046) 
[0.390] 
−0.069 
(0.067) 
[0.413] 
−0.057 
(0.055) 
[0.333] 
−0.086 
(0.075) 
[0.285] 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
−0.013* 
(0.055) 
[0.145] 
−0.129 
(0.081) 
[0.251] 
−0.128* 
(0.066) 
[0.089] 
−0.140 
(0.090) 
[0.158] 
District-by-year observations 12 12 24 24 
Individual property sales 19,735 9,700 126,565 53,606 
Note. Each column of figures are coefficients, with associated standard errors and p-values in parentheses 
and brackets, respectively, from separate regressions. The outcome variable in each regression is the 
natural log of the home sales price. “Diff.-in-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (4), “Diff.-in-diff. 
multiple sales” correspond to equation (5), and “Triple-diff. all sales” correspond to equation (5). “Triple-
diff. multiple sales” is based on equation similar to equation (5) with individual property covariates and 
neighborhood fixed effects replaced by individual property fixed effects. All estimates are based on four-
year pre-Say Yes and three-year post Say Yes observations. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10, ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically 
distinguishable from zero at 0.01. 
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Appendix B: Analysis of Housing Price Changes using Synthetic Control 
Method 
 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) propose a strategy for obtaining effect estimates in 
evaluations of unique interventions implemented in a single treatment unit, which they refer to as 
synthetic control methods (SCM).  Rather than choosing a single comparison unit, synthetic 
control methods identify a set of weights that can be assigned to a broad sample of comparison 
districts such that the resulting weighted averages of those comparison districts closely match the 
treated district on pre-treatment values.  Post-treatment outcome values for the synthetic 
composite district then provide credible estimates of the counterfactual post-treatment outcomes.  
Differences in outcomes between the treated unit and the synthetic control identify the estimated 
treatment effect. 
To test the sensitivity of our enrollment and housing price estimates to the specific comparison 
districts that we chose, we constructed synthetic controls for both Syracuse and Buffalo.  In order 
to have the largest set of districts from which the SCM algorithm chooses comparison units 
(“donor pool”), we used all school districts in New York State outside of New York City and 
Long Island.  Because Buffalo has substantially higher enrollment than all other upstate New 
York State districts aside from Rochester, the synthetic control model for Buffalo relies almost 
exclusively on Rochester to create the synthetic control, and therefore, the enrollment analyses 
below focus only on Syracuse. 
To choose covariates on which to match, we selected variables likely to be related to enrollment 
and housing price trends.  More specifically, for the enrollment model we use enrollment and the 
average shares of free-lunch eligible, African-American, and Hispanic students over the pre-
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treatment period.  For the housing model we use those student characteristics and measures of 
pre-treatment housing prices to control for pre-Say Yes price trends.   
Because housing prices vary considerably across metropolitan areas, and because our interest is 
in matching pre-treatment trends rather than levels, we transformed housing prices using the 
following procedure. First we regressed the log of real sales price on an array 
of housing characteristics and district-by-year fixed effects. We then retrieved the estimated 
district-by-year fixed effects and standardized them to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. This standardized measure was used with the district characteristics above to 
create the synthetic control districts.  
Figure 14: Enrollment in Syracuse and Synthetic Syracuse. 
 
Note. The SCM analysis gives weights to the following districts: Rochester (0.461), Niagara Falls (0.299), 
Elmira (0.094), Hopevale (0.083) and Buffalo (0.063). 
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As shown in Figure B1, the synthetic district matches the pre-treatment enrollment trends in 
Syracuse closely with the exception of 2005, in which Syracuse experienced a one-year increase 
in enrollments.  Rochester receives the largest weight and accounts for almost half of the 
synthetic district. Enrollments in the last pre-treatment year are almost identical for Syracuse and 
its synthetic control. Following the start of Say Yes, Syracuse enrollments level off, then 
increase, while those in the synthetic district continue to decline.   
To assess the likelihood that these results occurred by chance, we construct a synthetic control 
for each of the districts in the donor pool to derive a distribution of effect estimates.  Because the 
other districts in the donor pool were not exposed to the program, the effect on these districts is 
presumably zero.  Thus, the percentage of districts that have an effect estimate as large as or 
larger than that obtained for Syracuse can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining an effect 
estimate as large as for Syracuse, if the true effect of Say Yes were zero.  To ensure that the 
comparison of effect estimates controls for the quality of the pre-treatment match, the test 
statistic used is the ratio of the mean squared prediction error in the post-treatment period to the 
mean squared prediction error in the pre-treatment period. 
As shown in Figure B2, Syracuse’s pre-to-post difference is large but not the largest among the 
districts, with a p-value of 0.086. As in the difference-in-difference analyses presented above, the 
results provide some evidence of an unusually large enrollment increase in Syracuse following 
the start of the program, but one that is not be reliably different from zero at a 95 percent 
confidence level. 
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Figure 15: Randomization Inference Results, Syracuse Enrollment. 
 
 
Figure B3 displays the synthetic control analysis examining housing prices in Syracuse and its synthetic 
control. As shown in the figure, the pre-treatment trends for Syracuse and its synthetic control match very 
closely.  The root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE), a goodness-of-fit measure in which values 
closer to zero indicate better fit, is a low 0.037.  The synthetic district is composed primarily of Rochester 
(58 percent) with smaller contributions from other districts, including Buffalo.  Beginning in 2008, the 
first year of Say Yes, the trend lines diverge, with Syracuse increasing and remaining higher than the 
synthetic control district over the period. 
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Figure 16: Housing Prices in Syracuse and Synthetic Syracuse 
 
Note. The SCM analysis gives weights to the following districts: Rochester (0.581), Lackawanna (0.200), 
Poughkeepsie (0.105), Ticonderoga (0.049), Salamanca (0.016), and Buffalo (0.012).  
 
 
We again assess the likelihood that these results could have occurred under a null hypothesis that 
Say Yes had no effect on housing prices by constructing a synthetic control for each of the 
districts in the donor pool to derive a distribution of effect estimates.  Figure B4 shows that 
Syracuse’s effect is a far outlier, with a probability of obtaining an effect size that large by 
chance of 0.004 (=1/232).  The results also echo those of the regression analyses presented in the 
paper, with a large significant increase in housing prices in Syracuse following the start of the 
Say Yes program, relative to the comparison districts. 
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Figure 17: Randomization Inference Results, Syracuse Housing Prices. 
  
 
Figures B5 and B6 show the same analyses for Buffalo.  It is particularly notable that Rochester 
comprises 84 percent of the synthetic control for Buffalo.  The fit of the pre-treatment trend lines 
is strong, but less close than for Syracuse (RMSPE = 0.091).  Following the announcement of 
Say Yes in Buffalo, prices in Buffalo continued to decline steeply, while those in the synthetic 
district first leveled off, then declined slightly.  As shown in Figure B6, the treatment effect for 
Buffalo is not significant at conventional levels; the probability of obtaining this result by chance 
is 0.168 (= 68/404).  These results are again consistent with the regression-based difference-in-
differences analysis.  
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Figure 18: Housing Prices in Buffalo and Synthetic Buffalo 
 
Note. The SCM analysis gives weights to the following districts: Rochester (0.840), Binghamton (0.103), 
and Piseco (0.057). 
 
Tables B1 and B2 compare the regression-based estimates from the main text to the results of the 
synthetic control analyses.  In each case, the two methods produce results that are of the same 
sign and similar magnitudes.  As shown in Table B1, the Syracuse synthetic control enrollment 
analysis produces larger positive effects than the difference-in-differences analysis, which is its 
closest regression-based analogue. For example, the three-year synthetic control effect is 4.4 
percent as compared to 1.2 percent for the difference-in-differences analysis.  In Table B2, the 
comparison of housing price effects again shows somewhat larger positive effects in the 
Syracuse synthetic control analysis than in the difference-in-differences analysis and larger 
negative effects in Buffalo. 
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Figure 19: Randomization Inference Results, Buffalo 
 
 
We draw two primary conclusions from the synthetic control analysis.  First, the synthetic 
control method creates synthetic comparison districts in both cases (particularly Buffalo) that 
rely primarily on Rochester, providing support for the use of Rochester as the primary 
comparison district in the regression models. Second, the results from the regression analyses are 
robust to the use of synthetic controls, lending additional support to their validity.  
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Table 36: Comparison of the Synthetic Control and Regression-Based Estimates of Enrollment 
Effects (Syracuse) 
 
Variable 
Difference- 
in-differences 
Triple- 
differences 
Synthetic 
control 
1 year post Say Yes −0.004 
(0.019) 
[0.829] 
−0.007 
(0.018) 
[0.716] 
0.003 
2 year post Say Yes 0.019 
(0.023) 
[0.425] 
0.019 
(0.022) 
[0.404] 
0.037 
3 year post Say Yes 0.032 
(0.027) 
[0.277] 
0.030 
(0.026) 
[0.284] 
0.044 
Permutation p-value                  —               — 0.086* 
Note. Standard errors and p-values are in parentheses and brackets, respectively. The outcome variable in 
each regression is the natural log of the K–12 enrollment counts. All estimates are based on four-year pre-
Say Yes and three-year post Say Yes enrollment counts. * indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
statistically distinguishable from zero at 0.10. 
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Table 37: Comparison of the Synthetic and Regression-Based Estimates of Housing Price Effects 
 
Variable 
Diff.-in-diff. 
estimates 
Triple-diff. 
estimates 
Synthetic control 
estimates 
 
 
Panel A: Syracuse 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.052 
(0.035) 
[0.159] 
0.071 
(0.046) 
[0.136] 
0.124 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.022 
(0.036) 
[0.544] 
0.075 
(0.064) 
[0.119] 
0.074 
3 year post Say Yes 
 
 
0.065 
(0.044) 
[0.159] 
0.143** 
(0.057) 
[0.020] 
0.224 
Permutation-based p-values         —          — 0.004*** 
  Panel B: Buffalo 
 
1 year post Say Yes 
 
 
−0.024 
(0.035) 
[0.518] 
−0.042 
(0.048) 
[0.399] 
−0.057 
2 year post Say Yes 
 
 
−0.097** 
(0.036) 
[0.035] 
−0.111** 
(0.049) 
[0.035] 
−0.114 
Permutation-based p-values         —          — 0.168 
Note. Standard errors and p-values are in parentheses and brackets, respectively. The outcome variable in 
each regression is the natural log of the home sales price. All estimates are based on eight- year pre-Say 
Yes and three-year post Say Yes all sales data for Syracuse and eight- year pre-Say Yes and two-year post 
Say Yes all sales data for Buffalo. ** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable 
from zero at 0.05, and *** indicates that the coefficient estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero 
at 0.01. 
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